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DISASTER TRADEOFFS: THE DOUBTFUL
CASE FOR PUBLIC NECESSITY
Susan S. Kuo*
Abstract: When government takes private property for a public purpose,
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires just compensation. Courts, however, have long recognized an exception to takings law
for the destruction of private property when necessary to prevent a public
disaster. In those circumstances, unless the state accepts an obligation to
pay damages, individuals must bear their own losses. This Article contends that the public necessity defense should be rejected. First, the tight
time frame and limited options typical in a disaster response threaten to
obscure the crucial role of government in planning for disasters and
mitigating vulnerability. Second, and more fundamentally, the deliberate
infliction of harm remains wrongful, even if all available alternatives are
worse and the situation could not have been averted or ameliorated
through proper advance planning. A just compensation rule—whether
instituted via statute or judicial reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause—would preserve the government’s emergency powers
while reaffirming the rule of law and advancing the interests of social justice.

Introduction
Although the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides
that “private property” shall not “be taken for public use, without just
compensation,”1 the common law defense of public necessity justifies
“the destruction of ‘real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire’ or to forestall other grave threats
to the lives and property of others.”2 In such cases, an actor need not
* © 2013, Susan S. Kuo, Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina
School of Law. I thank Josh Eagle, Lisa A. Eichhorn, Melissa Hamilton, Benjamin Means,
and Kenneth Rosen for helpful comments and Justin Dixon, Bob Rees, and Michelle
Theret for research assistance.
1 U.S. Const. amend. V. Just compensation has been interpreted to mean fair market
value. See United States v. Fifty Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 (1984).
2 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16 (1992) (citing Bowditch v.
Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1879); see also John Alan Cohan, Private and Public Necessity and
the Violation of Property Rights, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 651, 653–56 (2007) (discussing the common
law principle of public necessity and noting that it can justify invasion or destruction of
private property).
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pay for damage done to private property.3 As one court put it, “the individual must yield to the community and accept his losses philosophically.”4 To ameliorate the harsh consequences of a common law rule
that forces a few individuals to bear costs for the benefit of society, most
states have enacted statutes to compensate victims, at least under some
circumstances.5 The federal government, however, has steadfastly refused to acknowledge any such obligation.6
This Article contends that the public necessity defense should not
apply to losses occasioned by disaster response.7 First, disaster harm
typically reflects prior government choices. With all due regard for the
time pressure and constrained choices that make disaster response difficult, it is important to ask whether the government failed to engage in
appropriate planning and mitigation efforts that would have reduced
disaster vulnerability. If so, the exigencies of a disaster should not absolve the government from responsibility when it invades and destroys
private property.8 For example, many experts believe that the U.S. Forest Service’s long-standing policy of suppressing fires has upset stable
ecological patterns in the Southwest and created the conditions for recent wildfire emergencies.9 In one recent case, involving damage to
properties from fires intentionally set by the Forest Service to combat a
3 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 & n.16. Although public officials are more likely to be in a
position to make such tradeoffs, the defense applies as well to private individuals who act
to protect the public. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 262 cmt. b (1965).
4 Dunn v. McCoy, 113 F.2d 587, 589 (3d Cir. 1940).
5 See infra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 98, 98, 101–02 (2012) (dismissing
a takings claim for damages after the U.S. Forest Service “intentionally lit fires in order to
manage a group of wildfires”); Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 48, 56
(2012) (dismissing a suit in which the plaintiffs claimed that the release of floodwaters constituted a taking).
7 Specifically, the Article’s focus is natural disasters; this Article does not consider additional issues that might be implicated in the context of warfare or other intentional disasters. Nor does this Article address whether the public necessity defense should continue to
protect individuals who damage private property while acting as Good Samaritans for the
benefit of the community.
8 See infra notes 64–141 and accompanying text.
9 See Christopher Joyce, How the Smokey Bear Effect Led to Raging Wildfires, NPR (Aug. 23,
2012 6:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/23/159373691/how-the-smokey-bear-effectled-to-raging-wildfires?sc=17&f=1001 (quoting Craig Allen, a research ecologist with the
U.S. Geological Survey, New Mexico, who compared areas in which fires have been suppressed to “caskets of fuel” and noted that “[g]unpowder has been building up in these
things for a century, and now it’s dangerous to try to defuse”); Christopher Joyce, Why ForestKilling Megafires Are the New Normal, NPR (Aug. 23, 2012 2:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/
08/23/159373770/the-new-normal-for-wildfires-forest-killing-megablazes (noting that, belatedly, the “Forest Service has changed its longstanding policy of ‘no fires’ [because] [i]t realized that the fuel buildup was dangerous”).
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wildfire, a court found that “the government is not liable when it destroys property ‘[t]o prevent the spreading of a fire.’”10 Although the
plaintiffs alleged that the background conditions requiring the controlled burn stemmed from the Forest Service’s misguided approach to
forest management, the court failed to consider the possibility that the
Forest Service was responsible for the conditions that had made the
wildfire so dangerous.11
Second, and more fundamentally, the public necessity defense
rests upon a consequentialist view of moral obligation.12 According to
this view, whether an action is wrongful depends upon the anticipated
consequences measured in terms of aggregate utility. Yet, tradeoffs that
involve the deliberate infliction of harm—sacrificing the few to spare
the many—remain wrongful even if the available alternatives are worse.
For instance, when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”)
opened spillways along the Mississippi River in the spring of 2011, inundating farmland in Mississippi, Missouri, and parts of southeast Louisiana, it was of little consolation to the flooded rural communities that
a threat to population centers downriver had thereby been averted.13
A just compensation rule—whether instituted through statutory
abrogation of the public necessity doctrine or judicial reinterpretation
10 TrinCo Inv. Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 101 (citing Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 502, 508 (1923)).
11 See id. at 101–02.
12 See Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil,” 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 44
(2010) (discussing the cost-benefit calculations of the consequentialist approach and its
focus on the outcome of any given action); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1913, 1914 (1999) (arguing that like “all of
the lesser-evil justifications, necessity is openly utilitarian”).
13 See Melanie Eversley & Rick Jervis, Missouri Farmers Return to “Ocean,” USA Today, May
12, 2011, at 3A; see also Melanie Eversley, Mo. Farmers Return to Lands Ruined by Blown Levee,
USA Today (May 12, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/201105-11-farmers-return-to-flooded-fields-missouri_n.htm (quoting a Missouri farmer who said,
“I feel we were sacrificial lambs in this . . . . They have treated us much more cruelly than
Mother Nature has ever done.”).
For example, one pending class action comprised of Louisiana residents seeks to establish that the Army Corps’s destruction of levees was a taking entitling the residents to just
compensation for their losses. See First Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, Quebedeaux v.
United States, No. 11-389L (Fed. Cl. Sept. 21, 2011) (alleging “intentional diversion of flood
water from the Mississippi River into the Atchafalaya River basin through the Morganza
Floodway,” thereby damaging or destroying the plaintiffs’ property); see also Second
Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, Big Oak Farms, 105 Fed. Cl. 48 (No. 1:11-CV-00275NBF) (seeking just compensation “for the taking of property owned by them . . . . when the
United States Army Corps of Engineers elected to operate the Birds Point-New Madrid
Floodway by destroying with explosives large portions of the frontline levee thereby inundating and destroying crops, property, businesses, buildings, and infrastructure with flood waters
and accompanying sand and gravel”).
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of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause—would preserve the federal
government’s latitude to respond to disasters in the public interest.14
Individual property owners, however, would not be forced to subsidize
collective benefits enjoyed by others.15 Indeed, requiring the state to
compensate individuals for economic loss would provide some assurance that disaster tradeoffs were meant to maximize aggregate welfare
and not to protect powerful constituencies.16 Moreover, because disaster harms register preexisting conditions of social inequality, disaster
law and policy cannot be separated from broader questions of social
justice. In sum, compensating harms caused by disaster tradeoffs has
practical and moral advantages.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains how the common
law defense of public necessity shields the government from liability for
actions taken during disaster response that would otherwise constitute a
taking of private property for a public purpose.17 Part II uses the “trolley
problem” scenario from moral philosophy to uncover the justificatory
framework for public necessity, and contends that the analysis should
also encompass a broader understanding of the causal factors underly14 In other words, the rule would mirror current takings law in that the government
would have substantial discretion to convert private property as necessary to serve the public interest so long as it was willing to compensate the owners for their loss. See First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987) (holding that the Fifth Amendment “does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power”).
15 In some cases, a property owner’s harm may be offset in whole or in part by private
insurance, if available, or by federally supported programs such as national flood insurance. See, e.g., NFIP, About the National Flood Insurance Program, FloodSmart.gov, http://
www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/about/nfip_overview.jsp (last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
Many standard policies exclude damages caused by governmental action, however, including “the destruction, confiscation or seizure of property.” Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Homeowners 3—Special Form 12 (1999), available at http://www.insuringflorida.org/assets/
docs/pdf/HO3_sample.pdf; see Home Insurance Exclusions: What Your Policy Won’t Cover,
Insured.com, http://www.insure.com/home-insurance/exclusions.html (last visited Jan.
7, 2013). Also, some poorer residents of at-risk communities live on fixed incomes and
cannot afford insurance premiums even at subsidized rates. Nevertheless, the question of
moral hazard arises if a landowner could have insured the property against the type of
harm incurred and chose not to do so. One possible solution would be for mortgage lenders to make flood insurance a condition of the loan; a detailed discussion of insurance
coverage issues, however, lies beyond the scope of this Article.
16 This is a matter of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Unlike Pareto efficiency, which only sanctions a shift in resources when the change benefits some party and harms no other party,
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency includes changes that benefit some at the expense of others, so
long as the injured parties could be fully compensated from the winners’ surplus while still
leaving the winners better off. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 13
(7th ed. 2007).
17 See infra notes 21–53 and accompanying text.
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ing disaster.18 Part III argues that, regardless of justification, deliberately
harming innocent people is wrongful and creates a moral obligation to
compensate the victims.19 Part IV responds to the objection that public
officials need broad police power to protect the public from disaster
harm.20 In fact, the availability of compensation would affirm the rule of
law without diminishing the government’s power to address crises in a
timely and effective manner. Furthermore, the disparate consequences
of recent flooding underscore the need to situate disaster law and policy
within a broader, sustained effort to achieve social justice.
I. A Necessary Evil
Natural disasters cause sudden, widespread, and catastrophic damage.21 In some cases, public officials in charge of disaster response may
face a choice of evils, in which intervening to protect the public requires the destruction of private property.22 This scenario is particularly
likely to arise in cases of flood, fire, and epidemic. For instance, fed by
record rainfall in 2011, the Mississippi River threatened to breach the
levee system built to contain it and forced a “bitter but necessary tradeoff.”23 In order to protect more populated areas, the Army Corps acted
pursuant to its statutory authority over the nation’s navigable waterways24 and opened floodgates to divert water toward rural communities
and farmland.25
18 See infra notes 54–141 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 142–232 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 233–286 and accompanying text.
21 See What Is a Disaster?, Int’l Fed’n Red Cross and Red Crescent Soc’ys, http://www.
ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/what-is-a-disaster (last visited
Jan. 7, 2013) (describing disaster as “a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the
functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the community’s or society’s ability to cope using its own resources”).
22 See Jim Chen, Modern Disaster Theory: Evaluating Disaster Law as a Portfolio of Legal
Rules, 25 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1121, 1140 (2011) (describing disaster law as risk management decision making); Cohan, supra note 2, at 725–28; see also Daniel A. Farber & Jim
Chen, Disasters and the Law: Katrina and Beyond, at xix (2006) (asserting that disaster law “is about assembling the best portfolio of legal rules to deal with catastrophic
risks—a portfolio that includes prevention, emergency response, compensation and insurance, and rebuilding strategies”).
23 See Campbell Robertson, Areas Will Be Flooded to Protect Louisiana Cities, N.Y. Times,
May 14, 2011, at A13; see also John M. Barry, Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood
of 1927 and How It Changed America 78–92 (1997) (providing an overview of flood
control efforts along the Mississippi River).
24 See Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. §§ 701a–701b (2006) (assigning the Army
Corps primary flood control responsibility for the nation’s navigable waterways). Further
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Under existing law, the federal government has no obligation to
compensate the affected landowners for their loss.26 Section A of this
Part explains that the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the
common law doctrine of public necessity as an exception to the principle of just compensation embedded in constitutional takings law.27
Nonetheless, the common law approach to necessity applies only in the
absence of specific legislation, and Section B reviews state statutes that
provide redress for damage to private property caused by public disaster response.28
A. The Public Necessity Exception
The underlying purpose of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause
is “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”29 According to the common law doctrine of public nelegislation has reaffirmed the Army Corps’s flood control mission while adding additional
responsibilities, including irrigation, navigation, recreation, and other water resource projects. See Water Resources Development Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-114, 121 Stat. 1041
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 33, and 42 U.S.C.); Federal Water Project
Recreation Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460l-12–460l-21 (2006); Water Supply Act of 1958, 43
U.S.C. § 390b (2006). Other federal legislation also affects the use and management of
navigable waters. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 and 16 U.S.C.); Federal Water Pollution
Control Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 33 U.S.C.); Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-624, 72 Stat. 563 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
16 U.S.C.); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006).
25 See Robertson, supra note 23. Local officials acquiesced, given that “the choice [was]
between bad flooding in one part of Louisiana, or potentially catastrophic flooding in
another.” See Campbell Robertson, Louisiana’s Dilemma: Bad Flooding, or Worse, N.Y. Times,
May 13, 2011, at A14. The flooding impacted approximately 2500 people and “thousands
of acres of farmland.” Id.
26 The Flood Control Act of 1928 specifically states: “No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at
any place.” 33 U.S.C. § 702c. The Act further provides that “the United States shall provide
flowage rights for additional destructive flood waters that will pass by reason of diversions
from the main channel of the Mississippi River.” Id. § 702d. The flowage easements to be
obtained in advance of any flooding, however, are not equal to the fair value of the property. Id. Moreover, the Act states that “in all cases where the execution of the flood control
plan herein adopted results in benefits to property such benefits shall be taken into consideration by way of reducing the amount of compensation to be paid.” Id. In other words,
even though the Army Corps might someday open the spillway and flood private land, the
advance price for permission to do so is reduced to reflect the interim benefit to the property from its proximity to a national levee system.
27 See infra notes 29–45 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 46–53 and accompanying text.
29 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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cessity, however, “one has a complete privilege to destroy, damage, or
use real or personal property if the actor reasonably believes it to be
necessary to avert an imminent public disaster.”30 Broadly defined, public necessity includes war and “emergencies such as fire, pestilence, police activities in apprehending criminal suspects, and other exigencies
in which government officials or private individuals take action to avert
a public danger.”31
In cases of public necessity, “the majority view is that there is no
duty to pay compensation.”32 Thus, in the 1879 decision, Bowditch v.
Boston, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[f]or the Commonwealth a
man shall suffer damage, as for saving a city or town a house shall be
plucked down if the next one be on fire; and a thing for the Commonwealth every man may do without being liable to an action.”33 For reasons not clearly explained, and apparently contrary to the spirit of the
Takings Clause, those unfortunate enough to lose their property to a
disaster response must bear the loss alone.34
Recent cases in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims have reaffirmed
this principle.35 For instance, in the 2012 case, TrinCo Investment Co. v.
United States, “the Forest Service lit a number of fires on or adjacent to
plaintiffs’ properties” in order to manage wildfires.36 The plaintiffs alleged that the Forest Service’s fires caused the damage and that the
30 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 196 (1965); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 24 (5th ed. 1984). A “public disaster” includes events
“such as a conflagration, flood, earthquake, or pestilence.” See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 196 cmt. a (1965).
31 Cohan, supra note 2, at 691; see also United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952)
(noting that “the common law had long recognized that in times of imminent peril—such
as when fire threatened a whole community—the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy
the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many more could be
saved”).
32 Cohan, supra note 2, at 691; see also Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386, 405 (1895) (noting
that the right of public officers or private individuals to destroy houses to prevent fire from
spreading rests on public necessity, and, absent a statute explicitly requiring otherwise,
does not bind actors to compensate, or even contribute to, the loss).
33 101 U.S. at 18 (citation omitted). In Bowditch, the common law had been modified
by a state statute that specifically authorized recovery, but its procedural requirements had
not been met and the plaintiff was denied recovery pursuant to the background common
law principles. See id. at 20–21.
34 See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the exception to takings law for public necessity appears to “stand as much upon tradition as
upon principle.” Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922).
35 See TrinCo Inv. Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 101; Big Oak Farms, 105 Fed. Cl. at 59. The Court
of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to hear takings claims under the Tucker Act. See 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
36 106 Fed. Cl. at 98–99.
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wildfires would not have damaged the plaintiffs’ property.37 Assuming
the truth of the facts alleged, the court accepted the government’s
principal argument that disaster response falls outside the Takings
Clause.38 Accordingly, allegations that the government intentionally set
fires that damaged the plaintiffs’ property failed to state a claim.39
Similarly, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim in another 2012 case,
Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, which involved allegations that the
U.S. government took plaintiffs’ “property without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment . . . by breaching the levee that protected plaintiffs’ property with explosives, unleashing a flood . . . .”40
The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the claim, despite specific allegations concerning the destruction of homes, crops, and farmland,41 in
part because “[w]here, as here, plaintiffs’ claim is based on a single
flood that has since receded, plaintiffs have not stated a takings claim.”42
Although the Takings Clause does not explicitly overrule the
common law defense of public necessity, the defense conflicts at a basic
level with a principle that requires the government to pay just compensation when it conscripts private property to a public purpose.43 Indeed, the just compensation principle seems squarely at issue when the
state seeks to advance public purposes that benefit the community in
aggregate by imposing ruinously high costs on a subset of vulnerable,
private individuals. The legitimacy of the public purpose is not at issue;
rather, the question is why private landowners should be barred from
seeking compensation for their losses. Takings jurisprudence, however,
has never been a model of clarity,44 and the public necessity exception
may be simply another case in point.45
37 Id.
38 Id. at 101–02.
39 Id.
40 105 Fed. Cl. at 49.
41 See Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 13, at 11–12.
42 Big Oak Farms, 105 Fed. Cl. at 56. The harm, in other words, was neither permanent
nor regularly recurring. See Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 521 (1883); Miss. & Rum River Boom
Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871) (holding that a dam that had caused economic damage was a
taking because the land in question was “actually invaded by superinduced additions of
water, earth, sand, or other material”).
44 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1170 (1967) (contending
that takings law is “liberally salted with paradox”); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1393, 1524 (1991) (describing the doctrinal “chaos” of takings
jurisprudence); Andrea L. Peterson, The Taking Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part
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B. Statutory Redress
Whether or not the Supreme Court revisits the public necessity
exception to the Takings Clause, public responsibility for damage to
private landowners need not track the outer boundaries of what the
Constitution permits.46 Rather than rely upon the common law defense
of public necessity, most states have enacted laws to clarify the government’s powers in the context of disaster response and to provide some
measure of compensation if the government seizes or destroys private
property.47 Only a handful of states have either passed laws that do not

I—A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 1299, 1303–04 (1989) (stating that takings law is “in far worse shape than has generally been recognized”); Carol M.
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 561
(1984) (finding the law of takings a “muddle”); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 Yale L.J. 36, 37 (1964) (cataloguing “a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible
results”).
45 For an argument that the Takings Clause should include necessity, see Derek T. Muller,
Note, “As Much Upon Tradition as Upon Principle”: A Critique of the Privilege of Necessity Destruction
Under the Fifth Amendment, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 481, 482–84 (2006). The author’s analysis
is consistent with the approach advocated in this Article, but narrower as it is limited to questions of constitutional interpretation and does not address the substantive content of the
public necessity exception or broader questions of moral justification. See id.
46 Indeed, in particular cases (including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001),
the government has established a fund for victims, but these payments are purely discretionary. See Julie Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 Tul. L. Rev.
167, 196–99 (2004).
47 See Ala. Code § 31-9-8 (2011); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 26.23.160 (West 2010); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 26-303 (2000 & Supp. 2011); Ark. Code Ann. § 12-75-124 (2003 & Supp.
2011); Cal. Gov’t Code § 8572 (West 2012); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-33.5-711.5 (2012);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 28-11 (West 2009); Del. Code Ann. tit. 20, § 3145 (2005); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 252.43 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012); Idaho Code Ann. § 46-1012 (2003); 20
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3305/7 (West 2008); Ind. Code Ann. § 10-14-3-31 (LexisNexis
2003); Iowa Code Ann. § 29C.6 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 48-933
(2005); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39A.110 (LexisNexis 1998); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:730
(2007); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 37-B, § 821 (2001); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 14-107
(LexisNexis 2006); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 30.406 (West 2004); Minn. Stat. § 12.34
(2010); Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-11 (2010); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 44.100 (West Supp. 2011);
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 81-829.57 (LexisNexis 2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 414.070 (2011);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:46 (2012); N.J. Stat. Ann. § A:9-51 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 166A-11 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 37-17.1-12 (2004 & Supp. 2011);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 401.192 (2011); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7301 (West 1988); R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. §§ 30-15-9, 30-15-11 (West 1994 & Supp. 2011); Tenn. Code Ann. § 58-2-115
(2002); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 418.152 (West 2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 11 (2011);
W. Va. Code Ann. § 15-5-6 (LexisNexis 2009).
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include a provision for compensation48 or appear not to have any applicable statutory provisions.49
Among the majority of states that provide for compensation, the
government conduct subject to compensation varies considerably. For
instance, a number of states, using substantially identical language,
provide as a general matter that “[c]ompensation for property shall be
owed . . . if the property was commandeered or otherwise used in coping with an emergency and its use or destruction was ordered by the
Governor or a member of the emergency forces of this state.”50 Yet,
those states’ statutes exclude the most common circumstances in which
private property might be seized:
Nothing in this section applies to or authorizes compensation
for the destruction or damaging of standing timber or other
property in order to provide a firebreak or damage resulting
from the release of waters or the breach of impoundments in
order to reduce pressure or other danger from actual or
threatened flood or applies to or authorizes compensation
beyond the extent of funds available for such compensation.51
By contrast, other states provide for just compensation, regardless
of the specific emergency. Connecticut, for example, authorizes the
governor to commandeer private property as necessary for disaster response, but provides in all cases that “[t]he owner of any property
taken under this section shall receive just compensation.”52 Likewise,
Mississippi’s governor may “commandeer or utilize any private property
if necessary to cope with a disaster or emergency, provided that such
private property . . . shall be paid for under terms and conditions
agreed upon by the participating parties.”53

48 See D.C. Code § 7-2206 (LexisNexis 2001); Ga. Code Ann. § 38-3-51 (2012); Haw.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 128-10.3 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2011); N.Y. Exec. Law § 29 (McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2012); Va. Code Ann. § 44-146.23 (2002 & Supp. 2012).
49 Research did not uncover statutes on point for Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio,
South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin, or Wyoming. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
50 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 252.43(3); accord Ark. Code Ann. § 12-75-124(c) (discussing
compensation in very similar language); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:730(E) (using substantially identical language about compensation).
51 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 252.43(6); accord Ark. Code Ann. § 12-75-124(f) (providing exceptions to compensation in very similar language); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:730(H) (using substantially identical language about exceptions to compensation).
52 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 28-11(d).
53 Miss. Code. Ann. § 33-15-11(c)(3) (2010).
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As the varying state approaches make clear, there is nothing ineluctable about public necessity doctrine. Congress has the power to legislate in this area and could supplement existing disaster laws aimed at
relief and recovery with a provision to compensate private individuals
whose land has been damaged or destroyed in order to protect the
public good. Such legislation would supplant the common law and
lessen the burden on courts by providing an administrative framework
for processing such claims.
II. Consequentialist Justifications
This Part explores consequentialist justifications of the common
law public necessity defense and offers a preliminary critique. In particular, if an assessment and potential justification of disaster response is
to turn on consequences, then the scope of the inquiry should capture
all choices causally related to those consequences, including decisions
that can precipitate or defuse disasters. A narrow focus on what necessity
requires in the context of a specific emergency response fails to account
for the broader role of the state and its concomitant responsibilities.
Unlike private actors, lawmakers and responsible officials must plan in
advance for disaster—not only to set priorities for tradeoffs among
harms, but also to mitigate vulnerability. Section A of this Part argues
that the defense of public necessity, as it is usually conceptualized, bears
a strong resemblance to the trolley problem studied in moral philosophy.54 In particular, necessity arises under time-constrained circumstances with restricted options and represents the best outcome among
imperfect options. Section B contends, however, that such trolley problems are artificial by design and that a public necessity justification for
disaster tradeoffs should, at a minimum, encompass a broader understanding of the causal factors underlying disaster.55
A. The Trolley Car Tradeoff
In their basic structure, disaster tradeoffs that require an actor to
cause harm in order to avoid greater harms resemble the well-known
trolley problem. In this problem, a trolley’s brakes have failed, and the
driver can either stay on course, in which case several people will die, or
else switch tracks and cause only one death. Here is the classic account
of the driver’s dilemma:
54 See infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 64–141 and accompanying text.
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Suppose you are the driver of a trolley. The trolley rounds a
bend, and there come into view ahead five track workmen,
who have been repairing the track. The track goes through a
bit of a valley at that point, and the sides are steep, so you
must stop the trolley if you are to avoid running the five men
down. You step on the brakes, but alas they don’t work. Now
you suddenly see a spur of track leading off to the right. You
can turn the trolley onto it, and thus save the five men on the
straight track ahead. Unfortunately . . . there is one track
workman on that spur of track. He can no more get off the
track in time than the five can, so you will kill him if you turn
the trolley onto him. Is it morally permissible for you to turn
the trolley? 56
Whether the hazard involves a flood, a fire, or a trolley car, the
moral dilemma is substantially the same: remain passive, or intervene,
thereby sacrificing bystanders in order to reduce the overall losses. Just
as the trolley driver’s choice determines who lives and who dies, disaster harms may depend upon the priorities of public officials. Thus, the
trolley problem can inform the moral choices that arise during a disaster when public officials must decide whether to cause (or fail to prevent) harm, be it the loss of life, liberty, or property, in order to avoid
greater harms.57
Most people who evaluate the basic trolley scenario conclude that
the driver may turn the car in order to save five helpless track workers,

56 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 Yale L.J. 1395, 1395 (1985) (citing
Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in Virtues and
Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy 19 (1978)). It is not clear why trolley cars
are taken to be emblematic of this kind of reasoning, but they do seem to spur the imagination. See, e.g., Mikhail Bulgakov, The Master and Margarita 214 (Mirra Ginsburg
trans., Grove Press 1995) (1967) (“‘Outright! I saw it. Would you believe it—one, and his
head was off! The right leg—crunch, and in half! The left—crunch, and in half! That’s
where those streetcars get you!’”).
57 In addition to tradeoffs between persons, tradeoffs can also occur between values—
for instance, the extent to which we are willing to compromise our collective liberty to
secure our collective safety. Benjamin Franklin famously declared, “Those who would give
up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”
Benjamin Franklin, An Historical Review of Pennsylvania, from Its Origin 289
(Philadelphia, E. Olmstead & W. Power 1812). Notably, Franklin did not discount safety’s
value but only asserted that sacrificing an “essential” value for a “temporary” benefit is
unwise. See id. We would have to venture beyond the rhetoric of his maxim to assess
whether a particular infringement impairs an “essential” liberty interest or whether the
benefit will likely endure so as to warrant that infringement.
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even though changing tracks will cost the other worker his life.58 Despite the moral principle that it is wrong to cause harm to another person, let alone deliberately kill that person,59 utilitarian considerations
prevail.60 Applying the same calculus, it seems that public officials acted
properly in responding to recent flood conditions on the Mississippi
River by breaching levees to divert water into rural areas in order to
save densely populated cities.61
The justificatory framework is consequentialist, rather than deontological, because it focuses on the sum of the benefits to be achieved
by an action and does not set any absolute limits based on fundamental
notions of right and wrong. For instance, as one commentator has observed, “If rescue workers must choose between groups of thirty and
five equally blameless people trapped in mine shafts, or caught in a
burning apartment building, or floundering in the sea, most people
think they ought to save the larger group straightaway.”62 If the question posed is whether to save more people or fewer people, the answer
seems obvious.63

58 See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 56, at 1395–96; Tim Stelzig, Comment, Deontology, Governmental Action, and the Distributive Exemption: How the Trolley Problem Shapes the Relationship
Between Rights and Policy, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, 932–33 (1998). Opinions vary as to
whether this decision is mandatory or merely morally acceptable. See id.
59 See Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints with Economic Analysis of Law, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 325, 325–26 (2008) (citing John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 26 (rev. ed. 1999) (1971)) (“Deontological moral theories
hold that whereas the goodness of outcomes counts, it is not the only morally relevant
factor. . . . Certain acts are inherently wrong and are therefore impermissible even as a
means to furthering the overall good.”).
60 See Alan Brudner, A Theory of Necessity, 7 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 339, 341 (1987)
(noting that the “theory of necessity as justification has traditionally been formulated in
utilitarian terms”); see also Joe Mintoff, Can Utilitarianism Justify Legal Rights with Moral
Force?, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 887, 909 (2003) (“[U]tilitarianism claims that the final moral end
is the promotion of human welfare.”). Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialist reasoning. See Zamir & Medina, supra note 59, at 329 (defining “consequentialism” as “a normative theory that ultimately determines the morality of an act or a rule (or anything else)
only through its consequences, and which rests on a theory of the good that takes into
account the well-being of every person”).
61 See Eric Rakowski, Taking and Saving Lives, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1063, 1063–67 (1993)
(discussing the utilitarian approach and applying it to hypotheticals). One potential weakness in the analogy is that the trolley hypothetical stipulates the relevant facts, whereas the
outcome of different decisions in the context of disaster may be uncertain. Cf. David
Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1425, 1426–28 (2005) (contesting the use of “ticking bomb” hypotheticals to justify torture).
62 Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1063.
63 But see infra notes 142–232 and accompanying text (posing scenarios that challenge
this moral intuition).
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At this point, though, it may be useful to distinguish the decision
set available to an actor in the midst of an emergency and the full panoply of planning, mitigation, and response decisions that a state actor will
make (or fail to make) over time. To the extent that public necessity is
measured at the time of emergency, the trolley problem provides a helpful account of the salient issues that must be evaluated. As the next Section illustrates, however, a complete necessity defense requires an actor
to have been without fault. Accordingly, application of the public necessity defense should include consideration of the state’s broader responsibility for conditions that may have contributed to the crisis.
B. A Broader Perspective
The radical simplicity of the trolley problem, if taken as representative of moral decision making, threatens to obscure the doctrinal difficulties inherent in applying the concept of necessity to public choices.
Specifically, the decisionmaker in a trolley problem cannot address the
factors that led to the emergency or devise alternate solutions; the purpose of the thought experiment is to pose terrible alternatives under
compressed time circumstances.64 All other considerations are stipulated away.65
Public disaster decision making illustrates the difference. Government deliberations can be perceived in terms of the immediacy of a trolley problem if courts, in considering claims of public necessity, evaluate
only the decisions made during a disaster emergency.66 Yet, notwithstanding this myopic view of disaster tradeoffs, public officials can act to
mitigate disaster vulnerability through careful planning, thereby reducing the likelihood that tradeoffs will become necessary.67 Or, as with the
flawed plan to suppress all forest fires, government error can exacerbate

64 See Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? 24 (2009).
65 See id.
66 See, e.g., TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 98, 101 (2012) (dismissing a
takings claim for damage caused by a fire set by the U.S. Forest Service to manage a wildfire, despite the plaintiffs’ argument that wildfires had become much more severe as a
result of prior, misguided Forest Service fire suppression efforts); Big Oak Farms, Inc. v.
United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 48, 57–58 (2012) (dismissing a takings claim premised on the
government’s release of floodwaters).
67 For instance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) promulgated the
National Disaster Recovery Framework in an effort to coordinate disaster recovery plans at
the federal, state, and local levels. See generally FEMA, National Disaster Recovery Framework (2011), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf (describing the concepts and principles that promote effective recovery assistance).
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natural hazards and make it necessary for government to intervene in
ways that cause harm.68
The state’s comprehensive responsibility for disaster response extends beyond the immediate crisis encapsulated by the trolley car dilemma. Accordingly, an evaluation of the defense of public necessity
should include the state’s responsibility, if any, for the factors that led to
the crisis and the adequacy of its plans concerning tradeoffs that might
become necessary. Two examples of disaster tradeoffs involving Mississippi River flooding will suffice to illustrate the importance of a broader
perspective.
1. Drowning St. Bernard and Plaquemines
The first modern flood control laws were enacted only after the
Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 made it painfully clear that the existing
patchwork of state oversight was grossly inadequate for the task.69 As a
matter of constitutional law, it had by no means been evident that the
federal government should have a substantial role. In 1824, in Gibbons
v. Ogden, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause gives
the federal government authority to maintain navigable waters and to
prohibit restrictions on transportation among the states.70 The extension of that authority to matters such as flood prevention, however, was
not clarified, and the overall extent of federal power under the Constitution was interpreted narrowly. Perhaps as a consequence, flood control efforts focused on levee construction on the theory that levees
would increase the river’s flow, deepening the channels and improving
navigability, an idea adopted despite the fact that it had been rejected
decisively by engineering experts.71
68 For example, in the 2012 case, TrinCo Investment Co. v. United States, the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims noted that “one of the [alleged] objectives of this management was ‘the
reduction of fuel buildup on national forest lands which had accumulated under the Forest Service’s historical fire abatement policy.’” 106 Fed. Cl. at 99 (citing the plaintiffs’
complaint).
69 See James M. Wright, Ass’n of State Floodplain Managers, The Nation’s Responses to Flood Disasters: A Historical Account 9 (2000), available at http://www.
floods.org/PDF/hist_fpm.pdf. A flood happens when “water runoff from the land exceeds
the capacity of the stream channel.” Id. at 3 (noting that floodwaters bring many benefits
as they replenish earth and refresh underground springs). Like other natural disasters,
floods are problematic “only when humans occupy space that streams require for their
own natural flood patterns.” See id.
70 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1824) (“The United States possess[es] the general power
over navigation, and, of course, ought to control, in general, the use of navigable waters.”).
71 See Joseph L. Arnold, The Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act 5 (1988)
(“[L]egislation relating to navigation improvements . . . was promptly passed, while flood
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In the spring of 1927, unusual amounts of rainwater saturated the
soil and fed the Mississippi River, causing severe flooding that displaced
hundreds of thousands of people.72 At its peak, the flood affected seven
states and engulfed 26,000 square miles.73 The flooding was exacerbated by the Army Corps’s exclusive reliance on levees, which ignored
scientific evidence that blocking the river would only escalate its flow
and raise its level.74 In New Orleans, residents watched the rising water
warily and read about flooding upriver with growing concern.75 An independent hydraulics engineer monitoring the situation issued a report to a prominent newspaper publisher identifying serious weaknesses in the city’s defenses, yet also noted that, “paradoxically, a great
flood would not threaten the city because it was certain to overwhelm
levees upriver.”76 In that case, the waters would “spread over the land,
lower the flood height at New Orleans, and eliminate any danger for
the city.”77 The principal threat was a flood high enough to breach New
Orleans’ defenses but not so powerful as to breach levees further upstream.78 In the ensuing weeks, the flooding worsened, and it became
increasingly likely that the upstream levees would indeed wash away.79
control legislation received indirect and limited attention.”). Constitutional concerns
aside, Congress was reluctant to assume financial responsibility for national flood control.
See id. at 3–4. Also, a “levees only” policy reflected the vision of Andrew Humphreys, who
became chief of the Army Corps in 1866. Id. at 7. Humphreys “labored constantly to quash
opposition to the ‘levees only’ policy, and it became the gospel for the Corps of Engineers
for over 60 years, until the 1927 Mississippi River flood decisively showed its limitations.”
Id.; see Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century
of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. Rev. 1471, 1476–78 (2007) (providing a detailed history
of federal flood control efforts and their failings).
72 Arnold, supra note 71, at 18 (reporting that “[m]ore than 700,000 people were
driven from their homes”); see also A.J. Henry, The Floods of 1927 in the Mississippi Basin, 67
Sci., Jan. 6, 1928, at 15, 15 (describing the various floods occurring late in 1926 and early
in 1927 that contributed to soil saturation and rising water levels).
73 Arnold, supra note 71, at 18.
74 See Patrick O’Hara, Delta Justice: The Trappers War and the Caernarvon Crevasse, Litig.,
Fall 2008, at 57, 58 (noting that “levees prevented flooding into natural spillways” and
caused the increasingly channelized river to bear down harder on the levees).
75 See id. at 59 (“Extensive news coverage caused consternation in New Orleans, even as
local newspapers played down the threat.”).
76 Barry, supra note 23, at 224; see also O’Hara, supra note 74, at 59–60 (noting that
“[t]here was no consensus among experts that breaking the levee was necessary,” and reporting that the chief of the regional office of the U.S. Weather Bureau thought it was
unlikely that New Orleans would flood, as failing levees in other areas reduced the threat
to the city).
77 Barry supra note 23, at 224.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 228–33; see also Kevin R. Kosar, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33126, Disaster Response and Appointment of a Recovery Czar: The Executive Branch’s Re-
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As river waters continued to rise, public life in New Orleans
ground to a halt; most people who had the means to evacuate availed
themselves of the opportunity, notwithstanding the fact that the New
Orleans papers censored the news in an effort to maintain calm and
hide the worst.80 On April 15, a rainstorm caused extensive flooding in
the city, exacerbating an already tense situation, and a group of the
city’s elite bankers met to discuss possible next steps.81 None had any
formal authority, but “[b]ankers had a history of taking charge in city
crises.”82 Further, the bankers’ own business interests were threatened
by the uncertainty.83 Public spirit and self-interest were deeply intertwined.
The central question discussed at the meeting, held at a local
bank, was whether to dynamite the levees so as to divert the Mississippi
River away from New Orleans and into neighboring St. Bernard and
Plaquemines Parishes.84 Although the group was aware that the levees
above New Orleans were unlikely to hold given the intensity of the
flood, the levee engineer also advised them that some of the escaping
water could rejoin the river and continue to threaten the city.85 Of
course, another powerful consideration for the assembled bankers was
the ongoing threat to the financial health of the city because the flood
could destroy the economic life of New Orleans, even if the city stayed
dry.86
Business in the city had all but shut down, and many feared that
bank runs were possible. Further, the city faced competition from new
ports in Gulfport, Mississippi and Mobile, Alabama, and a loss of confidence had the potential to aid those ports at New Orleans’s expense.87
One banker reported panic among New Orleans residents and argued
sponse to the Flood of 1927, at 3 (2005) (reporting that in April 1927, the Mississippi
River breached multiple levees in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri).
80 Barry, supra note 23, at 226 (noting that New Orleans was in an agitated state, since
“[n]o headline, or lack of one, could hide the Mississippi River”).
81 See Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph Thompson, Total Disaster and Total Justice: Responses to Man-Made Tragedy, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 251, 270–71 (2003); O’Hara, supra note 74,
at 59.
82 See Barry, supra note 23, at 229.
83 See id. (noting that “[i]mplicit in the inquiry was the question of investment risk, a
life-and-death question to” the correspondent banks that had sought assurances).
84 See Louisiana Levee to Be Cut to Make New Orleans Safe; Wide Area to Be Evacuated, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 27, 1927, at 1; see also Friedman & Thompson, supra note 81, at 270–71 (“[A]
group of government and business leaders decided to dynamite downstream levees in order to save [New Orleans].”).
85 See Barry, supra note 23, at 228, 231.
86 See id.
87 See id.
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that “[o]nly dynamite will restore confidence.”88 In other words, the
group was discussing “purposefully loosing the Mississippi River on
their neighbors . . . . a horrible thing.”89
Having concluded that dynamite might well be the answer, the
bankers sent members of their informal committee to attend an open
hearing of the Mississippi River Commission (the “Commission”) on
April 18, and in executive session presented their proposal to blow up
the levee, directing water away from New Orleans, and to build an
emergency spillway near Poydras, the place of the river break in 1922.90
The Commission president posed three conditions for approving the
request: (1) that the War Department (now known as the U.S. Department of Defense) approve the plan; (2) that the request come from the
State of Louisiana; and (3) that “the city would have to absolve the
commission of any liability for damages and arrange to compensate
victims of the crevasse fully for any and all losses.”91 Although the plan
involved the flooding of St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, representatives from the parishes were not invited to the hearing.92
As a practical matter, the possible dynamiting of the levee seemed
to consider only the interests of powerful New Orleans, a fact evident to
everyone involved, notwithstanding the talk of compensating those in
adjoining parishes for their losses.93 Indeed the Army Corps had previously made its position clear:
After the 1922 Flood the chief of the Army Corps of Engineers had advised the New Orleans financial community that,
if the river ever seriously threatened the city, they should blow
88 Id.
89 Id. at 232 (questioning the group’s motives: “How real was the threat to New Orleans?
The threat to its business was real enough, but how real was the threat of the river?”).
90 See id. at 238. The Commission had been established by Congress in 1879 to manage
federal levee development and flood control efforts. See Mississippi River Commission, U.S.
Army Corps Engineers, http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/About/MississippiRiverCommission MRC.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2013); The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, U.S. Army
Corps Engineers, http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/bro/misstrib.htm (last updated May
19, 2004).
91 Barry, supra note 23, at 238; see also Friedman & Thompson, supra note 81, at 271
(noting that New Orleans “promised to provide reparations to those in the rural region
and to create a $150,000 fund to care for the refugees”).
92 See Barry, supra note 23, at 239; see also O’Hara, supra note 74, at 60 (noting that
“[n]ot one public official from [the parishes of] Plaquemines or St. Bernard was present
when the decision to flood these parishes was made, nor was any involved in the negotiations leading up to that decision”).
93 See O’Hara, supra note 74, at 59 (emphasizing that the governor of Louisiana was
hesitant to dynamite the levee because doing so in order to save New Orleans “would be
unpopular in rural areas”).
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a hole in the levee. In the years since, those words had never
left the consciousness of either the people in St. Bernard and
Plaquemines Parishes, who would be sacrificed, or those who
dealt with the river in New Orleans.94
In other words, the availability of the tradeoff constituted an important part of disaster planning, such as it was. So long as neighboring
parishes could be flooded, if the need presented itself, New Orleans
could satisfy itself with existing bulwarks.95 The chief of the Army Corps
was effectively recommending that necessity, judged at the moment of
emergency, should guide the decision, and that private individuals
might even take matters into their own hands.96
Yet, the neighboring parishes were far from uninhabited. Detonating the levee would force 10,000 people to evacuate and would potentially obliterate two of the nearby parishes.97 These parishes, meanwhile, had several notable industries, including fur trapping, sugar
refinery, stockyards, and casinos.98 Nor were the levees left undefended
by the citizens of those parishes; St. Bernard’s Parish, for instance, had
hundreds of armed guards in place around the clock to prevent possible sabotage of the levee.99
On April 22, a New Orleans delegation met in Washington, D.C.
with the U.S. Secretary of War and the chief of the Army Corps concerning the plan.100 The chief pointed out that destroying the levee did not
94 Barry, supra note 23, at 222.
95 See id. From its founding, New Orleans has been vulnerable to flooding. See Wright,
supra note 69, at 4.
The modern flood problem began when the French Crown built a fortified
shipping center near the mouth of the Mississippi River. They chose this location because the waterway offered a superb avenue of transportation to the
Gulf of Mexico. By 1727, Nouvelle Orleans, the first permanent European settlement on the Mississippi, existed in a saucer of land that actually was lower
than the mighty river and was guarded from periodic inundation by an embankment only 4 feet high.
Id.

96 See Wright, supra note 69, at 4.
97 See Barry, supra note 23, at 234. New Orleans’ leaders thought that sacrificing St.
Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes was for “a greater good,” a better alternative than permitting a levee breach and the flooding of New Orleans itself. See Risk Mgmt. Solutions,
The 1927 Great Mississippi Flood: 80-Year Retrospective 6 (2007), available at http://
www.rms.com/publications/1927_MississippiFlood.pdf.
98 See Barry, supra note 23, at 234.
99 See id. at 241.
100 See Friedman & Thompson, supra note 81, at 271. By this time, the sheer number of
refugees and the scope of the disaster had made it impossible for the federal government
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appear to be necessary because levees upriver from New Orleans could
not hold and the city flood level would remain at manageable levels.101
One of the New Orleans representatives (a newspaper publisher with
Washington connections) responded by emphasizing the panic caused
by the flood’s threat and the Army Corps’s assurances concerning the
levee option.102 Ultimately, the Secretary of War agreed, subject to a
formal request from the governor of Louisiana, and provided full indemnification of the federal government from any responsibility.103
Persuading the governor was not a simple matter. With an election
impending, “[f]looding country people to save the city did not play
well politically in rural Louisiana.”104 Politics aside, the governor felt
that “there was something . . . foul about the idea of the government,
which should be trying to protect people, destroying people’s livelihoods.”105 As the governor contemplated the decision, he read a prediction made by the local U.S. Weather Bureau chief, Isaac Cline, that
levees above the city were unlikely to hold and that this would spare
New Orleans.106 The governor received further reports of levee
breaches in Arkansas and near Baton Rouge, suggesting New Orleans
was likely to be spared.107
Yet, even if the levee breach was no longer called for as a matter of
flood management, the New Orleans elite deemed it essential as proof
of a total commitment to protect New Orleans from danger.108 Faced
with unrelenting pressure, Cline agreed that he could not be sure how
the flood would affect the levees and consented to the conveyance of a
message to the governor that with another rise in the river, “if the levee
is going to be opened to relieve the situation it should be opened at
to ignore. See Barry, supra note 23, at 240 (stating that President Calvin Coolidge appointed U.S. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover chairman of a special committee to
coordinate rescue and relief efforts).
101 See Barry, supra note 23, at 240.
102 See id. at 241. The New Orleans publisher further stated, “what was the cost of blowing the levee? It would flow only marsh.” Id. He also quoted the chief’s predecessor, who
earlier had proposed blowing a “hole in a levee.” Id.
103 See id.
104 Id. at 242; see also O’Hara, supra note 74, at 59 (“Governor Oramel Simpson found
himself in a difficult position because cutting the levee to save New Orleans would be unpopular in rural areas.”).
105 Barry, supra note 23, at 242.
106 See id.
107 See id. at 243 (noting that “the failures of those levees also strongly suggested more
crevasses would follow”).
108 See O’Hara, supra note 74, at 59–60. Cline did not believe that New Orleans would
flood, as failing levees upstream would reduce the threat of flooding. See id. The city’s
leaders, however, exerted extensive pressure on Cline until he “eventually relented.” See id.
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once.”109 Based on this statement, the governor agreed to order the
levee’s destruction upon receipt of confirmation from engineers that
detonating the levee was “absolutely necessary” and “written promises
from the city of New Orleans to compensate victims for all losses.”110
The New Orleans establishment provided the governor what he
required, and the order to dynamite the levee followed. The citizens of
New Orleans were satisfied, but those in St. Bernard and Plaquemines
Parishes were “angry and frightened.”111 The sheriff in St. Bernard
stated, “We’re letting ’em do it because we can’t stop ’em . . . . You can’t
fight the Government.”112 In New Orleans, the “fine families, as if on a
picnic, traveled down to see the great explosion that would send dirt
hundreds of feet high and create a sudden Niagara Falls.”113 Meanwhile, “[a]s the explosion sounded, [the St. Bernard sheriff] flinched,
then turned around and said, ‘Gentlemen, you have seen today the
public execution of this parish.’”114 The next day, levees upstream gave
way, easing the threat—the destruction of St. Bernard and Plaquemines
had been totally unnecessary.115 The promised compensation from
New Orleans was never paid.116
The political machinations surrounding the destruction of St.
Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes exemplify a case in which public
necessity based upon immediate peril should be no defense to liability.
First, given the weight of expert opinion that the levees upriver would
109 Barry supra note 23, at 243–44.
110 Id. at 244. Governor Oramel Simpson required these safeguards because he only
“reluctantly agreed to authorize the artificial crevasse.” See O’Hara, supra note 74, at 60.
111 See Barry, supra note 23, at 255.
112 Id. at 257. Additionally, leading officials in Plaquemines and St. Bernard “recognized that nothing could be done to stop the levee break,” and proceeded to “persuade[]
the infuriated citizens that resistance would only add bloodshed to the tragedy.” O’Hara,
supra note 74, at 60.
113 Barry, supra note 23, at 256.
114 Id. at 257.
115 See id. at 257–58. In fact, it took ten days and 78,000 pounds of dynamite to create
the artificial crevasse. See O’Hara, supra note 74, at 60. Upstream levees began to fail after
the first day of dynamiting at Caernarvon. See id. In an interesting parallel, conspiracy
theorists in the Lower Ninth Ward during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 believed that the
levees were dynamited “with the intention of saving the wealthier and whiter sections of
the city.” Risk Mgmt. Solutions, supra note 97, at 6.
116 See Barry, supra note 23, at 360 (“No bank, business, or government agency ever
made a voluntary payment to the victims to fulfill the self-proclaimed moral obligation.”).
The promised compensation was contained in what was known as the “Citizens Resolution.” See O’Hara, supra note 74, at 60. None of the sixty-four signers committed public or
private funds, but rather “pledge[d] to do their best . . . to see that victims were reimbursed.” Id. A year later, the Louisiana Constitution was amended to provide for reparations to victims of the 1927 decision, but compensation payments were minimal. See id.
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give way naturally, there is a strong argument that there was no reasonable belief that the breach was necessary.117 If so, a basic element of the
necessity defense was missing. Second, even if the levee breach might
have been a reasonable exercise of discretion in dealing with a disaster
emergency, a broader perspective would encompass actions taken before the immediate crisis.
It was also negligent, if not reckless, for the Army Corps to tell New
Orleans to plan to flood its neighbor and to substitute this advice for
proper planning.118 Although the Army Corps’s advice was given years
before the 1927 flood, the irresponsibility of the advice should also
have exposed the United States to liability for the disaster. Moreover,
the levees-only policy adopted by the Army Corps was contrary to all
expert advice and designed only to make floods more severe. Indeed,
previous flooding had already made plain that there was a problem. As
exemplified by the woeful performance of the Army Corps in the years
leading up to the 1927 flood, inadequate disaster planning should be
relevant to a necessity defense, even if the case can be made that a particular disaster tradeoff was reasonably necessary in the midst of an actual emergency.119
2. “Project Flood”
The disastrous 1927 flooding provided the needed impetus for the
development of modern flood control laws.120 The Flood Control Act
of 1928 for the first time committed the federal government to flood
management, and created the Mississippi Rivers and Tributaries Project
117 See Barry, supra note 23, at 257–58; see also O’Hara, supra note 74, at 60 (noting
that Cline and other experts correctly predicted that natural levee breaches upriver would
have ensured that New Orleans would escape flooding). In fact, it seems to have been an
almost foregone conclusion that those with political and economic power would be protected and that the areas outside New Orleans were expendable; this conclusion was evidenced by the fact that the decision was made through the lobbying efforts of New Orleans politicians in a process that excluded the voices of those who would be affected and
who might have advanced other alternatives. See Barry, supra note 23, at 231, 239.
118 This wrongful act, however, may not have been actionable in 1927. Although the
Tucker Act of 1887 was available to redress claims for damages arising from the U.S. Constitution, Congress did not enact the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) until 1946. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); Tucker Act of 1887, 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a); Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Torts Claims Act: A Different Metaphor, 44 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 1105, 1106–09 (2009) (describing the FTCA as the
“exclusive vehicle” for bringing tort lawsuits against the federal government).
119 See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 71, at 1476–78 (detailing the history and failings of
federal flood control efforts).
120 See Wright, supra note 69, at 9.
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(the “Project”), a board which is administered by the Mississippi River
Commission (the “Commission”) and is supervised by the Office of
Chief Engineers of the Army Corps.121 Although the modern regulatory structure is a marked improvement over the ad hoc approach followed in 1927, a number of fundamental problems remain.
The Project’s task is to handle the “project flood” —any flood larger than the 1927 flood.122 The project flood represents a worst-case
scenario, developed in detail through a cooperative effort involving the
Weather Bureau, the Army Corps, and the Commission, and draws
from data about the “sequence, severity, and distribution of past major
storms.”123 The most recent version was developed in the mid-1950s.124
The project flood plan involves several components: (1) levees for containment, (2) spillways to divert excess flow, (3) channel improvements,
and (4) dams and reservoirs.125 These basic components remain in
place today.126 Notably, the Project represents a significant departure
from the Army Corps’s “levees only” policy, which failed so dramatically
in 1927,127 because it supplements the use of levees with spillways and
reservoirs to contain excess water.128
121 See Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. §§ 702b–702c (2006); see also supra note 90
(describing the Commission). Not until the Flood Control Act of 1936 did Congress authorize the creation of a truly national approach to flood control. See Arnold, supra note
71, at 1.
122 See The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, supra note 90.
123 Miss. River Comm’n, The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project: Controlling the Project Flood 2 (2007), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/climate/docs/
MR-T-info.pdf.
124 See id.
125 See The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, supra note 90.
126 See Miss. River Comm’n, supra note 123, at 2.
127 Under this policy, levees were relied on as “the only mechanism for flood prevention” because the levee system was thought to be a “sufficient flood prevention device by
‘scouring and enlarging’ the river beds and channel, allowing for more water to flow without escaping the river banks.” Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administrative Evolution, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 353, 393 (2011). A major component in the acceptance of the “levees only” policy was likely the fact that no resources were available to fund
alternative flood prevention mechanisms. See id. at 393–94.
128 See Miss. River Comm’n, supra note 123, at 2. Flood protection measures provided
for in the plan divide the Mississippi River into northern, middle, and southern sections.
Barry, supra note 23, at 423–25. In the northern section, the main “flood control feature
is a ‘floodway,’ essentially a parallel river 5 miles wide and 65 miles long, running from
Birds Point, Missouri, south to New Madrid, Missouri.” Id. at 423. The middle section contains a long stretch of levees, and, near the mouth of the Atchafalaya River, the “Old River
Control Structure and . . . the Morganza floodway, immense masses of concrete and steel
designed to divert” floodwaters into the Atchafalaya. Id. at 424. Finally, in the southern
section, there “is a concrete spillway at Bonnet Carre, 30 miles above New Orleans, designed to [send outflow] . . . into Lake Pontchartrain.” Id. at 425.
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Unlike in 1927, when it was unclear who had the authority to order the diversion of floodwaters, the operation of the floodways is today
assigned to the Army Corps and is not left to the discretion of local
public officials, let alone community leaders in areas potentially affected by flooding.129 Project flood provides detailed guidance; the
river conditions that would warrant use of the spillways can be anticipated and have been planned for in advance.130 Further, each aspect of
project flood is regulated by operational plans created pursuant to
statutory authority.131 For instance, the operational plan for the Birds
Point-New Madrid Floodway includes detailed protocol for ordering a
levee breach, executing the order, and evacuating residents.132 Consequently, flood-management decisions can be made without the unseemly and chaotic spectacle of various potential decisionmakers demanding legal opinions absolving themselves of responsibility.
The procedural improvements wrought by project flood are plain;
in addition to streamlining the decision-making process for addressing
flood conditions, the operational plans effectively codify the elements

129 See The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, supra note 90. In 1983, for example, rising floodwaters in the Mississippi Valley caused the Commission to make contingency plans
for the operation of the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway. See Miss. River Comm’n, The
Mississippi River and Tributaries Project: Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway 12
(2011), available at http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/mrc/mrt/Docs/Birds%20Point-New%
20Madrid%20info%20paper%20FINAL%200426.pdf. When the federal government instituted eminent domain proceedings, private plaintiffs who owned land that would be flooded
filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the Army Corps from breaching the levees and flooding the
Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway. Story v. Marsh, 574 F. Supp. 505, 508 (E.D. Mo. 1983),
rev’d, 732 F.2d 1375 (8th Cir. 1984). The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted a temporary injunction, declaring that breaching the levee would violate the
National Environmental Protection Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Fifth Amendment. See
id. at 517. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the Flood
Control Act of 1928 committed the decision of whether to breach the levee to the Army
Corps, a federal agency, and that the Army Corps’s discretionary decision was not subject to
judicial review. See Story v. Marsh, 732 F.2d 1375, 1379–82 (8th Cir. 1984). Although the government had not obtained flowage easements for the entire floodway, as required by section
4 of the Flood Control Act of 1928, the proper remedy for obtaining a flowage easement was
not an injunction, but rather proceedings under the Tucker Act to receive compensation for
the easement. Id. at 1384–85; see 33 U.S.C. § 702(d) (2006).
130 See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway Operations
Plan, at B-1 (1986) (on file with author) (outlining the conditions which would prompt the
use of the spillway and the timetable pursuant to which the Army Corps would operate,
should use of the spillway become necessary).
131 See id. at 1 (noting that the statutory authority for creating the plan derives from
the Flood Control Act of 1928 and the Flood Control Act of 1965).
132 See Barry, supra note 23, at 425.
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of necessity for activating a floodway.133 For instance, the decision to
open all three floodways in response to flood conditions in 2011 was
made pursuant to particular factors that had been identified and codified in accordance with ordinary agency rulemaking procedures.134
Nonetheless, for all the helpful guidance they provide, the operations plans only address the immediate tradeoffs involved in managing
flood conditions. A broader view of the problem, however, must take
into account the factors that can make flooding more or less likely. Despite the stated goal of managing the worst-case flood, the Army
Corps’s mission has grown ever more complex, including potentially
competing goals such as irrigation, recreation, navigation, reservoir
maintenance, and environmental protection.135
Also, just as the Army Corps once advised New Orleans that it
could drown its neighbors should the need arise, the Army Corps now
handles that unpleasant task directly, advising floodway residents that,
in the event of flood conditions, it could become necessary to open the
spillway.136 Admittedly, the notifications are an improvement in that,
returning to the trolley problem analogy, those in the path of the trolley have notice that the track will be switched if necessary to avoid
greater harm, thus allowing them to take appropriate precautions.137
133 See The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, supra note 90. The broader effectiveness of the flood control plans, however, may be questioned. See Klein & Zellmer, supra
note 71, at 1473 (arguing that the flood control system in the United States is defective
and is “incapable of controlling flood waters or preventing loss of life and property”).
134 See Morganza Floodway, U.S. Army Corps Engineers, http://www.mvn.usace.army.
mil/bcarre/morganza.asp (last updated Jan. 3, 2012); Paul Rioux, Morganza Floodway Opens to
Divert Mississippi River Away from Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Times-Picayune (New Orleans)
(May 14, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2011/05/morganza_
floodway_opens_to_div.html. Relevant factors include the following:
The decision to open the Morganza Floodway relies on current and projected
river flows and levee conditions, river currents and potential effects on navigation and revetments, extended rain and stage forecasts, and the duration of
high river stages. When river flows at the Red River Landing are predicted to
reach 1.5 million [cubic feet per second] and rising, the Corps considers
opening the Morganza Floodway.
Morganza Floodway, supra.
135 See supra note 24 (discussing the Flood Control Act of 1936, which assigned primary
flood control responsibility for the nation’s navigable waterways to the Army Corps, and
subsequent legislation that expanded the Army Corps’s responsibilities).
136 See Morganza Floodway, supra note 134.
137 Legal challenges to the floodway have been unavailing. In Kirk v. Good, a 1929 case
from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, a farmer who owned
property within the floodway area sued to enjoin the construction contracts to build the
setback levee. 13 F. Supp. 1020, 1021 (E.D. Mo. 1929). Kirk claimed he would be unable to
sell his property or use it as security for loans because it had the possibility of being
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Yet, because of the notice (and nominal easement payments in many
cases), those private individuals must take on the full risk of loss for the
community. In effect, the government has paid a modest premium to
shift the collective responsibility of insuring against loss from its own
shoulders, which are as broad as the federal government’s tax base, and
onto individuals who lack significant economic resources, and, as a
practical matter, may not be able to obtain insurance coverage.138
The Army Corps operations plan also fails to consider background
conditions of social inequality that relegate some people to areas subject
to flooding.139 For instance, as observed in one news report covering the
2011 floods, “nine of the 11 counties that touch the Mississippi River in
Mississippi have poverty rates at least double the national average of 13.5
percent.”140 Although the levees protected urban areas, they provided
no defense to smaller, poorer communities in the Mississippi River delta
and in counties abutting the river south of the delta and into Louisi-

flooded in the future. See id.; Brian Lee & Alice M. Noble-Allgire, High Water in the Nation’s
Breadbasket: A Takings Analysis of the Government’s Response to the Mississippi River’s Great Flood
of 2011, 26 Prob. & Prop. 28, 32 (2012). The court denied the application for an injunction, holding that Kirk’s damages were “mere consequential damages such as the prospective construction of any great public work is likely to entail, and for which relief is not afforded.” Kirk, 13 F. Supp. at 1021. Additionally, the court held that an injunction was an
inappropriate remedy, as the Flood Control Act of 1928 provided for adequate remedies in
the form of flowage easements. See id.; see also supra note 129 (discussing Story v. Marsh and
a failed challenge to the Army Corps’s use of the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway).
138 See Nate Monroe, Future Uncertain for Those Without Flood Uninsurance, Daily
Comet.com (May 21, 2011, 6:01 AM) http://www.dailycomet.com/article/20110521/
ARTICLES/110529947?template (interviewing a homeowner who “has understood the
urging of local, state and federal officials over the years that home owners like herself in
flood-prone communities purchase flood insurance”). One homeowner explained that she
would buy the insurance if she could afford it, but she lives on a fixed income. See id. Otherwise, she reported, “I would be as insuranced out as I am licensed up if I could.” See id.
139 Similar problems arise from local decision making “when the obstacles to exit are
insuperable for some yet easily overcome by others.” Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice 36
(2001) (citing white flight from inner-city school districts as an example of an exit option
negatively impacting the effectiveness of localism). In light of “the reality that different
players are differently bound by collective decisions,” one scholar has suggested that “constraints other than choosing one local decision rule over another should come into play.”
Id. For similar reasons, the Army Corps ensures that important tradeoffs will not be determined by local political power. Nonetheless, because the choices made by the Army
Corps pursuant to the Flood Control Act do not take into account preexisting inequities,
this Article endorses official planning that addresses and mitigates disaster vulnerability.
140 Poor Taking Brunt of Mississippi’s Bulge, MSNBC.com (May 11, 2011, 8:32 PM), http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42985277/ns/weather#.UKMwEIf4Lng (citing figures from the
U.S. Census Bureau). Exercising his presidential discretion, President Barack Obama signed
a disaster declaration for fourteen Mississippi counties affected by the flooding, making lowinterest loans available to cover uninsured damage. See id.
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ana.141 Consequently, the floodwaters overflowing the banks of the river
and its tributaries left their mark on those least able to bear it.
Rather than seek to account for social inequality, the cost-benefit
calculus called for in the Army Corps operations plan takes existing
distributions of property, population, and other relevant factors as givens, as noted above. Once we move past the limiting assumptions of the
trolley problem framework, however, background conditions of inequality should give us pause, especially when the government’s approach to disaster tradeoffs does nothing to resolve the substantive unfairness of taking from those least able to afford the loss.
III. The Limits of Consequentialism
Moral choices involve the character as well as the consequences of
our actions. To claim otherwise is to accept that the ends can always
justify the means.142 Variations of the basic trolley problem help to focus attention on categorical moral constraints as well as contingent
cost-benefit analysis. For instance, if we conclude that we would save the
five helpless workers by switching tracks, we may then be presented with
a related scenario in which the only way to save the five workers is to
shove an obese man onto the tracks in front of them.143 Or we may be
asked to imagine that we are a physician who can save five of her patients only by sacrificing one healthy patient and harvesting his organs.144 In each case, the raw numbers are the same—one life for five—
and yet the choices are not morally identical.145
141 See id.
142 According to some scholars, the ends never justify the means; for instance, deontological constraints do not bend to utilitarian considerations even when torturing a terrorist
could reveal the location of a hidden nuclear weapon. See Jeremy Waldron, Torture,
Terror and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House 1–20, 186–91 (2010); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 Colum. L. Rev.
1681, 1709–17 (2005). Others recognize the existence of moral constraints but contend
that morality does not preclude the torture of other human beings if the benefits of doing
so are sufficiently large. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge 141 (2002) (advocating for the institution of judicial “torture warrants”).
143 See, e.g., F.M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality: Volume II: Rights, Duties, and
Status 143–72 (2001) (discussing the trolley problem and defending the distinction between killing and redirecting harm); Sandel, supra note 64, at 22–23 (discussing this version of the trolley problem).
144 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Torture, Necessity, and the Union of Law & Philosophy, 36
Rutgers L.J. 183, 188 (2004). One might resist the force of the hypothetical by positing a
further deterrent effect on healthy patients going to doctors and a longer-term deterioration
of the health of society (i.e., that the overall utility calculus might be improved by allowing
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Accordingly, this Part contends that even if disaster tradeoffs were
judged without regard for precipitating factors that may have exacerbated social vulnerability, the state’s moral responsibility extends beyond the simple maximization of aggregate benefits. Section A revisits
the trolley problem and argues that disaster tradeoffs involve moral dilemmas because all available choices involve the violation of a moral
maxim.146 Section B contends that public necessity doctrine relies upon
a thin version of moral consequentialism and fails to engage with the
full weight of the moral dilemmas that arise during disasters.147 Section
C argues that a decision to inflict harm on innocent people is always
tragic and deserving of recompense.148
A. Moral Dilemmas
A moral dilemma involves a situation in which one both “ought to
do something and ought not to do that thing.”149 Or, to put the point
slightly differently, a dilemma can arise if “it seems that I ought to do
each of two things, but I cannot do both.”150 Whether the relevant
choice involves action versus inaction, or a choice between two different actions, moral dilemmas concern “cases in which there is a conflict
between two moral judgments . . . relevant to deciding what to do.”151
In these cases, deliberation offers no decisive reason to prefer one or
the other alternative.152
the four patients to die). But this avoids the point and could be resolved through further
stated assumptions (i.e., that the healthy patient’s disappearance can be concealed).
145 To be clear, I do not aim to offer a comprehensive moral theory that could successfully join utilitarian and deontological concerns. Rather, I simply take it as a given that
ordinary moral judgments include the nature of an action as well as its outcome, such that
killing a healthy patient to harvest his organs is qualitatively different than redirecting the
path of a runaway trolley car.
146 See infra notes 149–180 and accompanying text.
147 See infra notes 181–217 and accompanying text.
148 See infra notes 218–232 and accompanying text.
149 See E.J. Lemmon, Moral Dilemmas, in Moral Dilemmas 101, 105 (Christopher W.
Gowans ed., 1987). One philosopher has contended that, because an individual remains
free to choose one of the alternatives, there is no formal contradiction. See id. at 107. “It is
a nasty fact about human life that we sometimes both ought and ought not to do things;
but it is not a logical contradiction.” See id.
150 See Bernard Williams, Ethical Consistency, in Moral Dilemmas, supra note 149, at
115, 121 (“The two situations, then, come to this: in the first, it seems that I ought to do a
and that I ought to do b, but I cannot do both a and b; in the second, it seems that I ought
to do c and that I ought not to do c.”).
151 See id. at 120.
152 See Philippa Foot, Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma, in Moral Dilemmas, supra note
149, at 250, 260–61 (“[A]n obligation is not annulled by being overridden, and . . . it is
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Moral dilemmas may stem from a common obligation owed to
more than one person or may reflect differing sources of moral obligation.153 For instance, we incur “specific obligations . . . either by a deliberate undertaking or by some special relation to the person or institution in question.”154 Simply by making a promise, one incurs some
obligation to perform according to the promise.155 Such obligations
will often have legal force. For example, in criminal law, the “creation
of peril” doctrine and the doctrine of voluntary assumption of care and
seclusion both impose a duty to act on an individual and provide for
criminal sanctions for those who fail to act.156 In corporate law, managers owe fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.157
In addition to particularized contractual or fiduciary obligations,
there are also “constraints on action deriving from general rights that
everyone has, either to do certain things or not to be treated in certain
ways.”158 The derivation and precise content of these rights are, of
course, debatable.159 On even the most limited view of our obligation
to others, for instance, the use and exercise of our own rights cannot
preclude others from enjoyment of similar basic rights.160

possible to say that a subject ought to do something even when a more pressing claim
makes it impossible for him to do that thing.”).
153 See Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in Moral Dilemmas, supra note 149,
at 174, 175 (contending that “[t]here are five fundamental types of value that give rise to
basic conflict”).
154 Id.
155 See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 7–17 (1981) (arguing that such moral obligation provides an explanatory structure
for the law of contract).
156 See Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 Yale L.J. 1236,
1274 (2010) (“Once persons have voluntarily assumed responsibility to care for designated
dependents, any failure to provide appropriate care should subject the registrant to criminal liability.”); John A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal
Analysis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 213, 229–30 (1975) (describing the “creation of peril” doctrine’s
applicability to infants delivered alive).
157 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
1549, 1593–97 (1989).
158 Nagel, supra note 153, at 175.
159 See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities
and the Communitarian Agenda 4–11 (1993) (noting that “incessant issuance of new
rights . . . causes a massive inflation of rights that devalues their moral claims”); Mary Ann
Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 7–17 (1991)
(discussing the unique nature of the American view on what constitutes the scope of a
general right, and arguing that the current absolute deference to such rights “promotes
unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue”).
160 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 33 (1974) (arguing that there is
no “justified sacrifice of some of us for others”).
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Another category of moral obligation relies on consequentialism:
“the consideration that takes into account the effects of what one does
on everyone’s welfare—whether or not the components of that welfare
are connected to special obligations or general rights.”161 For example,
if one has made a promise and it now appears that performing the
promise would damage the community, the effect on public welfare is a
moral consideration that the promisor would have reason to take into
account.162
When the values on each side of a moral equation are weighty, the
conflict can appear insoluble. Every choice appears to be foreclosed in
advance, and yet we must somehow choose. Inaction is, after all, also a
choice. The most difficult dilemmas of this kind involve the loss of human life—when our ability to save the greatest number of lives turns on
our willingness to sacrifice other lives. The conflict pits the obligation
to account for everyone’s welfare by saving as many people as possible
against the obligation to refrain from causing injury to another person.163
To dramatize this predicament, we might again consider a scenario
in which “a runaway trolley will kill five workers unless a bystander
shunts it onto a side track, where it will kill one.”164 Unless the bystander acts, more people will be killed; yet, if she acts, she will cause
the death of an innocent person who otherwise would not have been
harmed. In order to protect the five workers, most of us conclude that
“the right course—certainly in most cases an irreproachable course—is
to divert the train.”165 The analysis is utilitarian, because it justifies the
action by its overall consequences—preserving the lives of five people,
rather than only one.166
By contrast, it is generally accepted that a surgeon should not carve
up one healthy patient and harvest his organs in order to save five criti161 Nagel, supra note 153, at 175 (identifying this category as “utility”). Professor Thomas Nagel also identifies “perfectionist ends or values” and a “commitment to one’s own
projects or undertakings” as additional grounds for moral choice. Id. at 176.
162 See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and
Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 17, 42–48 (1985). Assuming that
the potential damage to the community was significant, the choice between the promise
and the community’s welfare would hardly count as a moral dilemma.
163 See Nagel, supra note 153, at 175.
164 Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1063. In other versions of the hypothetical, the decisionmaker is the trolley driver rather than a bystander. For our purposes, nothing turns on
this distinction.
165 Id. at 1063–64.
166 See Zamir & Medina, supra note 59, at 329.
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cally ill patients.167 Although we may assume that this is the only way to
help the five, killing an innocent patient is categorically wrong, regardless of the number of lives saved.168 It would be better, most people conclude, to allow the five patients to die, even though the surgeon had the
power to save them. Logically, the contrast seems puzzling; although
utilitarian considerations prevailed in addressing the trolley problem,
here the best outcome appears to be prohibited by deontological constraints.169 The task, then, is either to account for the divergence in our
strong moral intuitions, despite the fact that the same number of lives is
at stake, or else to argue that one or both of the moral principles that
seem to guide our intuitions are mistaken or misconstrued.170
The difficulties explored in the trolley problem are relevant to disaster response because natural disasters create real-life situations involving similar considerations. For example, public officials in recent disasters have had to decide whether to flood farmland and small towns to
protect cities,171 whether to expose plant workers to potentially fatal
levels of radiation to stabilize damaged nuclear reactors,172 and
whether to order looters shot on sight to maintain public order.173 In
each case, the choice was whether to harm some people in order to
protect many more.174
167 See Ferzan, supra note 144, at 188 (“[W]hile most people believe it is permissible to
turn the infamous runaway trolley so that it kills one lone worker instead of five, we reject
that a surgeon can kill one person and use his organs to save five others.”).
168 See Sandel, supra note 64, at 23.
169 See id. at 23 (noting the existence of “conflicting moral principles” in that “one
principle that comes into play in the trolley story says we should save as many lives as possible, but another says it is wrong to kill an innocent person, even for a good cause”).
170 See John Martin Fischer, The Trolley and the Sorites, 4 Yale J.L. & Human. 105, 105–09
(1992) (rejecting the distinction between the trolley and transplant examples).
171 See Robertson, supra note 25.
172 See Martin Fackler, Japan Weighed Evacuating Tokyo in Nuclear Crisis, N.Y. Times, Feb.
27, 2012, at A1 (describing the conclusion of an investigative report issued by the Rebuild
Japan Initiative Foundation as follows: “‘Prime Minister Kan had his minuses and he had
his lapses,’ Mr. Funabashi said, ‘but his decision to storm into Tepco [the company that
operated the nuclear power plant] and demand that it not give up saved Japan.’”). To
accomplish the goal, Japanese officials increased the legal levels of radiation exposure so
that TEPCO workers could be sent in to stabilize damaged nuclear reactors. See id. Of
course, unlike the victims of a runaway trolley, the workers had the ability to refuse to work
and may (or may not) have been provided with accurate information about the radiation
risks involved.
173 See Troops Told “Shoot to Kill” in New Orleans, ABC News (Sept. 2, 2005, 4:25 PM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-09-02/troops-told-shoot-to-kill-in-new-orleans/2094678
(reporting Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco’s statement that the National Guard had
orders “to shoot and kill ‘hoodlums’”).
174 Even more difficult choices are not hard to envision. If a fatal, incurable, and
highly contagious disease were detected in an urban center, for instance, might the gov-
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Moreover, the trolley problem analogy applies even when officials
do not cause harm but fail to prevent it, because neglect can be as fatal
as deliberate injury175—when not everyone can be rescued, triage prioritization will determine who lives and who dies.176 To see the analogy,
imagine that disaster officials are operating a trolley car that rescues the
people in its path instead of killing them; when those who are abandoned by the trolley will die, the choice of tracks is no less important
than in the original scenario.177 Thus, as a matter of formal structure,
the trolley hypothetical applies to decisions that involve causing harm
and to decisions that involve rescue.
Described more formally, the moral dilemma in triage situations is
whether to rescue Group A or Group B when both cannot be rescued.
For instance, when evacuating patients during Hurricane Katrina, were
hospital officials right to leave the sickest patients for last?178 Although
we might have assumed that officials would prioritize those who were
most vulnerable, in fact they concentrated their initial efforts on the
healthiest patients in the hospital: “Those who were in fairly good
ernment establish a quarantine, condemning even uninfected people within the cordon to
a certain and painful death? For fictional accounts of this scenario, see Albert Camus,
The Plague (1947) (outbreak of bubonic plague); 28 Weeks Later (Twentieth Century
Fox 2007) (spread of deadly “Rage Virus”).
175 See Susan S. Kuo, Bringing in the State: Toward a Constitutional Duty to Protect from Mob
Violence, 79 Ind. L.J. 177, 222–26 (2004) (arguing that official failure to act can compound
riot harm or even spark a riot).
176 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1081 n.43, 1154–55. If people are lying helpless on
the track, do we rescue them in the order that we find them, or focus on moving the
greatest number (perhaps by focusing on the lightest weight), or look for the mayor and
important officials, or start with women and children? Long-established maritime practice,
for example, prioritizes women and children during emergency evacuations. See Brian
Palmer, Abandoning Ship: An Etiquette Guide, Slate ( Jan. 17, 2012, 4:55 PM), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/01/costa_concordia_sinking_what_
s_the_etiquette_for_abandoning_ship_.html.
177 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1063–64. More specifically, rescuing anyone other
than the first person encountered in a disaster area corresponds to a choice to switch
tracks. There may be good reason to find the mayor and other key officials first, or to identify schools and hospitals as initial priorities, and a wholly arbitrary approach is probably
both impractical and nonsensical. Nevertheless, however rational it may be to prioritize,
the task carries with it heavy moral implications. See id.
Why may, or must, the number of survivors be maximized in some instances
but not others? The answer, I suggest, is fundamentally the same for cases in
which one or more people must be killed so that others may live and cases in
which only some of those imperiled can be saved . . . as when a rescue ship
can save the passengers of only one of two capsized boats.
Id.

178 See Sheri Fink, The Deadly Choices at Memorial, N.Y. Times Mag., Aug. 30, 2009, at 30–
31, 34.
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health . . . [were] categorized ‘1’s’ and prioritized first for evacuation.
Those who were sicker and would need more assistance were ‘2’s.’ A
final group of patients were assigned ‘3’s’ and were slated to be evacuated last.”179 Even if the triage appears counterintuitive, the prioritization is not obviously wrong if we accept that the officials did not expect
to be able to evacuate everyone and believed that those in the hospital
would drown regardless of their health.180 In sum, plausible reasons
could be given for choosing different evacuation protocols.
B. Varying Approaches
In each disaster response scenario, some people’s lives, health, or
property are sacrificed for the sake of others.181 Although real-world
scenarios are far more complex, in part because they have a “before” in
which choices can help to create or forestall future crises, the choices
officials confront in the midst of a disaster do resemble those hypothesized in the trolley problem.182 Notably, the moral foundations for public necessity are partial and uncertain. As a quick canvas of philosophical approaches to moral dilemmas reveals, any plausible solution must
attain more than a reduction in overall harm. To be clear, the goal is
not to endorse a solution to the trolley problem, but to highlight the
inadequacy of the justification for insulating the state from legal responsibility for the harms caused by disaster tradeoffs.
1. Simplifying Assumptions
Trolley problems differ from actual disaster tradeoffs in that they
exclude all but the most salient facts. Consequently, the dramatization
of the moral dilemmas is thin; the runaway trolley, the transplant surgeon, and their variants are akin to the word problems in a math text-

179 See id. at 34.
180 In making this observation, I am not suggesting whether the hospital officials in
New Orleans were, in fact, motivated by these considerations.
181 We will assume that tradeoffs are one-to-one—property for property, life for life—
and that, apart from very extreme examples, no serious argument would sacrifice human
life to preserve other people’s property.
182 Cf. Naomi Zack, Ethics for Disaster 34 (2009) (“[D]isaster itself, in involving
human life and well-being, is a full-blown and real moral matter—[although] it should be
noted that thinking morally about disaster is greatly assisted by the uses to which philosophers have already put lifeboat ethics scenarios.”).
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book. Each situation has a patina of realism but lacks the nuances and
complexities of real life.183
In the standard version of the trolley problem, we know nothing
about the people involved, and we are not permitted to speculate about
factual alternatives—for instance, whether the track workers might escape from the trolley’s path.184 Unless a particular hypothetical has
been designed to test probabilistic reasoning, the consequences of different choices are given as certainties. Also, each trolley problem exists
in a hermetically sealed world with no “before” and no “after” such that
questions of costs and benefits over time cannot be used to evade the
central dilemma.185 Indeed, simplification is the whole point of such
hypothetical examples.186
Thus, although trolley problems are stories, we are not in the
realm of narrative as argument.187 Trolley problems engage the imagi183 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1068 (beginning with simplified assumptions, including that the “people considered—victims and beneficiaries alike—are the same age, are in
identical health, enjoy equal rights as members of the rescuer’s community, and are
equally blameless or blameworthy”).
184 This is a possibility that my law students often suggest in an understandable effort
to sidestep the dilemma.
185 See Sandel, supra note 64, at 24. For instance, it may be hard to ascertain the likely
effect on social welfare of a collective decision that involves a gain in welfare for some individuals and a loss for others. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of
Contract 8 (1993) (“Suppose that it were proposed that a major new multi-lane highway
be constructed through an urban area, generating gains in utility for commuters . . . but
losses in utility to inner-city residents . . . . How can decisionmakers be confident that the
net effect on social welfare . . . will be positive?”). For one answer to this particular question, see Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities 14–15 (1961)
(arguing that rational urban planning that ignores the needs of real human beings living
in communities will produce perverse consequences). The difficulty in assessing costs and
benefits will be particularly nettlesome if the likelihood and severity of the anticipated
harm also involve probabilistic judgments. See Barry, supra note 23, at 257–58 (describing
measures taken in 1927 to save New Orleans from flooding at the expense of neighboring
parishes, and arguing that “the destruction of St. Bernard and Plaquemines was unnecessary [and that] [o]ne day’s wait would have shown it to be so.”).
186 See Sandel, supra note 64, at 24. According to Professor Michael Sandel:
Hypothetical examples such as the trolley story remove the uncertainty that
hangs over the choices we confront in real life. They assume we know for sure
how many will die if we don’t turn—or don’t push. This makes such stories
imperfect guides to action. But it also makes them useful devices for moral
analysis. By setting aside contingencies— “What if the workers noticed the
trolley and jumped aside in time?” —hypothetical examples help us to isolate
the moral principles at stake and examine their force.
Id.

187 Cf. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle of the Space Traders:
Would the U.S. Sacrifice People of Color If the Price Were Right?, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 321, 328
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nation and are intended to trigger and to test moral intuitions, but they
are highly stylized representations of reality and not themselves rich
enough to embody any particular argument about morality. Rather,
they help us to develop analytic tools for thinking logically about moral
dilemmas in the real world—such as those implicated in disaster response—by highlighting particular factors while removing other variables from consideration. Carefully controlling the variables facilitates
analysis of their individual relevance as well as their potential interactions.188 Ultimately, the goal is to identify factors that can be applied to
moral dilemmas whether the factual circumstances involve trolley cars,
surgeons, or any other threat to life, health, or property.
2. Unmixed Moral Theories
One lesson that emerges from the study of trolley problems is that
absolutist moral theories fail to provide consistent guidance toward the
resolution of moral dilemmas. In some versions of the trolley problem,
an acceptable moral outcome will follow if we focus solely on consequences. In other versions, it appears that the nature of an action determines its morality, regardless of its likely or actual outcome. Thus, if
we attempt to resolve a particular moral conflict by adhering to either a
consequential or a categorical moral theory, different trolley problems
can be constructed to confront that moral theory with potentially monstrous outcomes that could follow from strict adherence to its precepts.189

(1991) (“Legal storytelling is a means by which representatives of new communities may
introduce their views into the dialogue about the way society should be governed. Stories
are in many ways more powerful than litigation or brief-writing and may be necessary precursors to law reform.”).
188 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1068 (discussing simplified assumptions). For instance,
we might vary the anonymity of the workers by stipulating that the lone worker is the trolley
driver’s cousin. Now we have added an issue of family obligation that might, or might not,
alter our view of what the driver ought to do. If we had access to the information, we might
also want to know the age of the workers, their relative health, and, for that matter, whether
someone was going to invent a cure for cancer should her life be spared. In the real world, as
in the trolley world, we proceed with imperfect, limited data. See Jacob Heller, Abominable Acts,
34 Vt. L. Rev. 311, 343 (2009) (arguing that in “trolley” moral dilemmas, the judgment made
is intuitive since there is little time to evaluate available facts).
189 One commentator has proposed that a third approach, virtue ethics, might help in
extreme cases in which advance planning cannot prevent the need for a tradeoff among
important interests. See Zack, supra note 182, at 34 (“In those cases, the right decisions will
depend on the degree of confidence we can place in the characters of participants and
leaders.”).
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For instance, categorical constraints against causing harm buckle
as the consequences of inaction escalate. For most people, it is enough
to ask whether to turn the trolley to kill one person or allow five people
to die. If you are made of sterner stuff, we can change the stakes: turn
the trolley toward one person to save fifty people; shoot an innocent
person or an entire village will be slaughtered; torture the terrorist or
the nuclear device will detonate in a large city. By stipulating that the
feared result will come to pass unless you act, trolley problems test the
resolve of nonconsequential moral commitments. At the furthest extreme of the moral imagination, we must be prepared to accept either
the destruction of the species or the obligation to cause harm, even if
only to a single person, to prevent it.190
Likewise, trolley problems can expose the potential inhumanity of
consequential reasoning. Notwithstanding the doctrine of public necessity, we cannot judge actions solely by their consequences any more
than we can ignore those consequences. Though it may be that a trolley
driver should aim the trolley toward one person rather than allowing it
to strike five, it seems less apparent that a bystander should be prepared
to shove an obese person onto the track in front of the trolley if that
would also save the five.191 Nor is it clear that a doctor should kill her
unsuspecting patient and harvest his organs to save five other patients.
Likewise, regardless of the overall benefits, few would countenance the
torture of a terrorist’s innocent children in horrible ways to extract useful information as quickly as possible to prevent the planned murder of
five people.192 Again, the deliberate artificiality of these scenarios precludes objections concerning the efficacy of the methods at issue or any
side consequences that might alter the cost-benefit analysis. In sum,
either consequential or categorical reasoning may appear to produce
better results in particular cases, but the fit is only contingent. Any
plausible approach to trolley problems must produce acceptable results
across a range of possible cases.

190 See Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 10 (1978) (rejecting consequential moral
reasoning but admitting that it would be “fanatical to maintain the absoluteness of the
judgment, to do right even if the heavens will in fact fall”).
191 See, e.g., Sandel, supra note 64, at 22–23 (discussing this version of the trolley problem); see also Kamm, supra note 143, at 143–72 (defending the distinction between killing
and redirecting harm).
192 Versions of this problem that state an alternative in which a nuclear device goes off
in a large city may overcome our horror at the prospect of torturing innocent people, but
also reflect the categorical nature of the constraint. It is not enough to offer a modest improvement in overall consequences.
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3. Mixed Solutions
Although this is not the place to attempt a comprehensive survey
of philosophical approaches to trolley problems, the “redirected
harm”193 and “hypothetical consent”194 approaches are representative,
and offer different sets of analytic tools to grapple with disaster tradeoffs. Both approaches attempt to account for the divergence of our
moral intuitions in cases in which achieving the best overall outcome
may involve the deliberate infliction of harm on innocent people.195
a. Redirected Harm
Some scholars contend that we should distinguish between cases in
which the source of harm is external to the actor and cases in which
the harm originates with the actor.196 According to this view, it is morally permissible to redirect an existing threat in order to protect as
many people as possible, but it is not permissible to cause a different
sort of harm, even if the goal is the same.197 Thus, it is proper to switch
trolley tracks to save five track workers, because the same harm will befall one of two groups and the actor did not originate the harm. A surgeon may not operate on a healthy patient to save five other patients
who need transplanted organs, however, because the decision to operate causes harm distinct from the diseases that will otherwise claim the
lives of the five patients in need of the transplants.
To put the redirected harm principle into the context of disaster
response, consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, a flood threatens
waterfront property, and a levee system gives public officials the ability
to channel the water toward Lot A or Lot B. If Lot A contains expensive
condominiums and is of much greater economic value, public officials
might choose to divert the water toward the more modest residential
193 See infra notes 196–207 and accompanying text.
194 See infra notes 208–217 and accompanying text.
195 Again, my goal in reviewing these proposed solutions to trolley problems is to derive tools for thinking about disaster tradeoffs, not to resolve the philosophical dispute.
196 See James A. Montmarquet, On Doing Good: The Right and the Wrong Way, 79 J. Phil.
439, 446–49 (1982) (distinguishing between a scenario in which actors already face death
and only some can be saved and a scenario in which a new threat is created by the actor’s
decision); Thomson, supra note 56, at 1403–04 (distinguishing various scenarios on the
basis of whether an actor, trying to maximize the utility, infringed on the rights of others).
197 See Thomson, supra note 56, at 1403. Professor Judith Jarvis Thomson has further
conditioned a tradeoff based on redirected harm by stipulating that the redirection cannot
be accomplished by “means [that] themselves constitute an infringement of any right” of
those who would find themselves in the path of the redirected harm. See id.

164

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 54:127

properties located on Lot B.198 In a second scenario, the floodwaters
threaten to engulf Lot A alone, and officials bulldoze the Lot B structures and use their ruins as a bulwark to protect Lot A. In this version,
as with the surgeon hypothetical, deliberate harm is inflicted to provide
the means of protecting others. Accordingly, the second scenario would
fail the redirected harm test.
The principle that officials should not originate harm is also supported by its broader applicability.199 To see how this intuition might
operate outside the context of disaster, imagine a different scenario:
public officials exercise the power of eminent domain to seize waterfront property identical to Lot B in the first scenario described above
and give it to a developer who creates expensive condominiums identical to Lot A.200 In this example, loosely borrowed from the 2005 U.S.
Supreme Court case, Kelo v. City of New London,201 Lot A is created, and
Lot B is destroyed; without Lot B’s destruction, Lot A would not exist.
Yet, even assuming that the officials have acted in good faith to benefit
the community, the Kelo scenario seems open to moral objection, because the officials originated the harm that befell Lot B.202
At a deeper level, the redirected harm approach relies in part on
the moral principle, articulated by Immanuel Kant, that it is improper
to use a person as a “means” rather than as an “end.”203 Human beings
198 This scenario involves the assumption that no lives are at stake, that the same number of residents would be affected in either case, and that the only issue is the protection
of property. One could argue that economic value should be irrelevant; for purposes of
the example, I mean to assume only that Lot A has greater social value such that a neutral
third party would prefer that Lot A survive the disaster.
199 See Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the
Social Sciences 20 (2007) (stating that a principle is strengthened by its application to a
new context, novel facts, or counterintuitive explanations).
200 Assume that the compensation offered to the owners of Lot B is insufficient to
compensate them for the harm they suffer in being forcibly ejected from their land.
201 See 545 U.S. 469, 472–75 (2005).
202 Although it may always be true that officials originate harm when they exercise the
power of eminent domain, the choice to build a road, hospital, or sports stadium can exist
independently of a decision concerning which current property owners to burden via the
takings power. By contrast, in Kelo the officials decided to take land from current homeowners in order to give it to a private developer—the economic development of the particular property was the alleged public purpose. See id. at 491–92. Numerous observers
criticized the Kelo decision. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Essay, The Uselessness
of Public Use, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1412, 1423 (2006); see also Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An
American Original, 8 Green Bag 355, 357 (2005) (“Few takings cases sparked as harsh a
reaction as did Kelo.”).
203 See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 38 (Mary
Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785). Notably, one could develop an
approach based on the “ends” versus “means” distinction that does not also rely on redi-
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are not mere instruments to be used to achieve a particular result.204
Thus, we can distinguish cases in which the death of an innocent bystander is an incidental consequence of an action and when it is the
direct means for achieving the end of saving more lives.205 It could be
appropriate, therefore, to cause a trolley car to switch tracks, even
knowing that a helpless person is on the alternate track, because the
intention is not to use that person’s life to save the others. Rather, the
death is an unintended, though foreseeable, by-product of an action
taken to save the five on the other track. Conversely, a surgeon acts
immorally if she kills one healthy patient in order to harvest his organs
for the benefit of several other patients—here, the healthy patient is
made the means to the salvation of the others. Or, to cite a common
trolley car example, it would be wrong to push an obese man onto the
tracks in front of the trolley in order to stop it from killing five innocent track workers.206
If accepted, the redirected harm principle (and the underlying
distinction between treating people as “means” rather than as “ends”)
could account for many situations in which public officials seek to divert flood or fire damage in order to minimize harm, as well as triage
choices in which public officials cannot save everyone. To be clear, any
particular decision would still be open to criticism—for instance, if the
choices were made in an arbitrary or biased fashion—but the inherent
tradeoffs would not themselves violate moral principles.
One notable objection to the redirected harm principle is that the
difference is merely “phenomenological” —that is, although “it might
feel more dastardly” to shove the obese man onto the tracks rather than
to turn the wheel of the trolley, the source of the harm is not relevant
rected harm. See, e.g., Michael J. Costa, The Trolley Problem Revisited, 24 S.J. Phil. 437, 437–
42 (1986) (using the doctrine of double effect to distinguish actions that properly treat
individuals as “ends” from those that use them as “means”); Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, 98 Phil. Rev. 287, 288–90
(1989) (distinguishing between action that causes harm and inaction that allows harm to
occur).
204 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1071 (arguing that approaches to the trolley problem that rest on Kantian considerations all hold that “killing somebody in a way that makes
him a direct instrument for saving one or more other persons is impermissible, except
perhaps if the number of lives saved or the good achieved is very much greater than the
evil of using somebody as a means by killing him”).
205 See id. As Professor Eric Rakowski has summarized, “Several proposed answers to
the question of when one may kill to save lives rely crucially upon the notion that a person
is used impermissibly as a means to enhance the welfare of others when he is intentionally
made a causal antecedent of their salvation.” Id.
206 See Sandel, supra note 64, at 22–23.
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to whether we are satisfying Kant’s moral requirement that we treat
others as “ends” and not “means.”207 Neither the obese man nor the
lone track worker has any agency—we decide what will happen and act
accordingly. Thus, treating others as beings worthy of equal respect requires more than an examination of the source of the harm.
b. Hypothetical Consent
An alternative approach to the trolley problem seeks to hew more
closely to the Kantian imperative by asking whether, hypothetically, the
victims would have agreed to a rule designed to save the most people if
asked before knowing whether they would be the ones saved.208 This
approach, in more detail, is as follows:
[P]eople may . . . be killed to save a larger number of others if
. . . a majority of those affected by a life-saving decision either
endorsed a policy maximizing the number of lives saved or
would have welcomed that policy in the circumstances in
which they found themselves were they aware of their moral
and religious beliefs, their desires and aversion to risk, and
their personal abilities and history, but ignorant of whether
they would be killed or saved under the policy.209
In other words, “paternalistic intervention” is acceptable because, under the circumstances, a person is treated “in the manner he would
have chosen had he been free from the pressures of his life-threatening
predicament.”210
For example, it seems rational to prefer a rule that directs trolley
drivers to avoid as many people as possible, even if that means switching tracks toward an innocent person. From the standpoint of selfinterest, a rule that maximizes lives saved is more likely to work to our
benefit than a rule that forbids the driver from altering course. Odds
207 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1096.
208 See id. at 1065 (emphasizing the importance of “[a]cting towards those in danger as
they would have wanted one to act—not as imaginary rational people . . . would have chosen”).
209 Id. Professor Rakowski takes into account the interests of “those who dissent or who
would have dissented for either moral or religious reasons (and not so that they could ride
free) . . . and who would be killed if the greater number were saved,” but permits the majority’s desire for a maximizing tradeoff if the dissenters could not be excluded from the
benefits and their chances of survival would be improved by adoption of a maximizing
scheme. Id.
210 Id.
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are greater that we will be one of the five than the lone track worker.211
By contrast, we might not endorse a rule in which healthy patients
could be sacrificed to save sick patients—as a form of quasi-insurance,
we would be subsidizing unhealthy habits and also damaging the relationship of trust between doctors and patients.212
The hypothetical consent approach gives a method for thinking
about tradeoffs that have not been decided in advance. For instance, it
is very unlikely that those who may find themselves trapped on a lifeboat and running out of food will have given thought to whether cannibalism would be an acceptable alternative to starvation, and, if so,
how to select the victims.213 Indeed, a hypothetical consent approach
explicitly excludes cases in which preexisting law governs the outcome,
focusing instead on cases in which a decisionmaker has no knowledge
of “any explicit agreement intended to guide her decision by those she
might save or kill and situations in which no agreement exists.”214 The
runaway trolley is a paradigmatic example, because the trolley driver
and track workers have not communicated previously and there is no
opportunity for them to do so once the trolley’s brakes have failed.
As with any approach to decision making that rests upon what the
parties would have decided, however, outcomes depend upon our assumptions about human motivation. This, in turn, restates the more
fundamental questions about morality, at least as an empirical matter. If
people behave like the utility-maximizing rational actor of neoclassical
economics, for instance, we may assume that they will generally choose
rules that maximize their expected individual benefits and that ends
211 See id. (“[I]f somebody would reasonably have favored killing under certain circumstances—because, for example, that course would tend to maximize the number of lives
saved and thus antecedently reduce her own risk of dying—then killing that person to save
others is morally permissible, or even commendable.”). But see Judith Jarvis Thomson,
The Realm of Rights 180–81 (1990) (pointing out that better odds would not be realized
if the lone worker was a beam fitter, assuming beam fitters always work alone, in which case
a bystander may not turn the trolley towards the one).
212 See Thomson, supra note 211, at 183–84. Although the choice may be purely hypothetical—no such vote would ever take place, and the doctor-patient relationship would
not actually be harmed by the secret killing of a healthy patient—the hypothetical chooser
would feel differently about going to the doctor after consenting to the sacrifice of healthy
patients, and therefore, would take this adverse consequence into account. Thus, the decision whether to kill a healthy patient cannot rely on the logic of hypothetical consent if
that consent would not have been given had there been time and motivation to deliberate
in advance.
213 See generally Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng.) (involving
the murder and consumption of a cabin boy by starving sailors). For a different sort of
lifeboat problem, see supra notes 56–63.
214 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1068.
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will feature more prominently than means.215 On the other hand, if we
recognize the value that people ascribe to social connections and fairness, we will give more weight to categorical constraints on actions that
cause harm.216 For instance, individuals motivated by fairness might not
agree to sacrifice human beings simply as means to an end. Thus, the
hypothetical approach authorizes us to apply ordinary moral intuition,
but it does not provide independent answers. Also, the hypothetical
consent approach seeks to mimic what would have been decided by an
individual or community—thus emphasizing the importance of what
those affected by an emergency would want—but does not address the
question of whether an actual decision could or should have been
made before the crisis.217
C. An Unavoidable Tragedy
In an important sense, disaster tradeoffs and trolley problems have
no morally satisfactory answer; tradeoffs that involve the sacrifice of life
or other fundamental values are always fundamentally tragic.218 The
insight here is not new; the calamity of choosing when the choice necessarily entails the sacrifice of crucial moral values is featured in Greek
tragedy. For instance, in Sophocles’ play, Antigone, King Creon has forbidden the burial of a traitor and Antigone must choose whether to
obey his edict and her obligations as a citizen or to honor her duties as
a family member.219 A choice can be justified (or at least excused) without lessening our regret over the choice.

215 See Hanoch Dagan, Between Rationality and Benevolence: The Happy Ambivalence of Law
and Legal Theory, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 191, 192 (2010) (“Law’s conventional story assumes that
its subjects are rational maximizers of their self-interest.”).
216 See id. at 199 (contending that human behavior is more complex and that “people
. . . are indeed self-interested and potentially other-regarding and community-seeking”).
217 See Zack, supra note 182, at 26 (“Broad public discussion of the allocation of limited
resources in emergencies should be a vital component of disaster preparation in a democratic society.”).
218 See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis,
29 J. Legal Stud. 1005, 1007 (2000) (noting that a tragic question arises when there is no
right answer, and describing such a tragic question as a situation in which “all the possible
answers to the obvious question, including the best one, are bad, involving serious moral
wrongdoing”); Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
160, 160 (1973) (examining the choice between two equally wrong courses of action).
219 See Sophocles, Antigone, in The Three Theban Plays: Antigone, Oedipus the
King, Oedipus at Colonus 55, 61–63 (Robert Fagles trans., 1984).
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Trolley problems are difficult because the alternatives are all unpalatable.220 In cases of serious moral conflict, it is not necessarily true
that further deliberation will indicate that one of our moral beliefs is
false, and that we can proceed unperturbed with the correct course of
action.221 Rather, “it is surely falsifying of moral thought to represent its
logic as demanding that in a conflict situation one of the conflicting
thoughts must be totally rejected.”222 At a minimum, it is not irrational
for an individual to feel regret.223
Accordingly, public choices involve more than a weighing of desired outcomes against the cost of achieving them. Even in the simplest
version of the trolley problem, there is something troubling about turning the trolley to aim at an innocent person, even if the rationale for
doing so—avoiding the death of five other innocent people—is sound.
As one scholar has observed, reducing public decision making to costbenefit analysis risks obscuring the moral complexity of our choices.224
If morality were nothing more than utilitarian calculation, the problem
of dirty hands could not arise: “Even when [a public official] lies and
tortures, his hands will be clean, for he has done what he should as best
he can, standing alone in a moment of time, forced to choose.”225
220 See Nussbaum, supra note 218, at 1007 (distinguishing between “obvious” and
“tragic” questions). As Professor Martha Nussbaum has observed, the “obvious” question—
what to do—may actually be quite difficult to answer. See id. But this difficulty is distinct
from the deeper realization that no answer to a problem can be adequate to our moral
obligations—this is the “tragic” question. See id.
221 See Williams, supra note 150, at 122.
222 Id. at 134.
223 See id. at 122–23. “The notion of an admirable moral agent cannot be all that remote from that of a decent human being, and decent human beings are disposed in some
situations of conflict to have the sort of reactions I am talking about.” Id. at 123. Some
scholars concede that people will feel these emotions, but maintain nevertheless that “an
adequate moral theory must rule out genuine dilemmas.” See Terrance C. McConnell,
Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics, in Moral Dilemmas, supra note 149, at 154, 155;
Williams, supra note 150, at 123. This Article does not take a position as to whether moral
dilemmas are “genuine” when “there are overriding moral reasons for acting on one
rather than the other [moral consideration].” McConnell, supra, at 155. Rather, the point
is that the outweighed moral considerations are not thereby extinguished—it is this feature that makes it possible to regret an action that one feels was correct.
224 See Nussbaum, supra note 218, at 1007–08 (“Too much reliance on cost-benefit
analysis as a general method of public choice can . . . distract us from an issue of major
importance, making us believe that we have only one question on our hands, when in fact
we have at least two.”). Those questions are what we should do under the circumstances
and whether any available choice can be morally justified. See id. at 1007.
225 Walzer, supra note 218, at 169 (noting that this is a very “improbable” account of
morality, in part because our moral views are socially constructed and a theory of morality
that does not grapple with our deeply held beliefs cannot be useful).
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Two consequences follow from the recognition of tragedy in disaster tradeoffs. First, there is an obligation to avoid, or at the very least to
mitigate, harm.226 Within the trolley car scenario, for instance, we
might ask why the track workers were on tracks in active use, whether
there was a warning signal system in place to alert trolley drivers to the
presence of workers on the tracks, how the tracks were designed and
maintained, and whether the trolley’s brakes had been properly serviced. In this case, we are asking the standard questions of tort law.227 A
trolley owner who failed to take basic precautions ought not to be able
to invoke a doctrine of necessity to excuse the loss of life that results
from that negligence, even if, viewed in isolation, the tradeoff chosen
during the emergency that results is appropriate given those avoidable
circumstances.
Second, when a tradeoff cannot be avoided, the “recognition that
one has ‘dirty hands’ is not just self-indulgence: it has significance for
future actions.”228 In particular, “[i]t informs the chooser that he may
owe reparations to the vanquished and an effort to rebuild their lives
after the disaster that will have been inflicted upon them.”229 Section
196 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts affirms the existence of a moral
obligation to provide compensation for property damage in public necessity situations:
Although the moral obligation to compensate the person
whose property has been damaged or destroyed for the public good is obviously very great, and is of the kind which
should be recognized by the law, the rules as to governmental immunity for suit have stood in the past as a barrier to
226 See Zack, supra, note 182, at 22 (advocating “Save All Who Can Be Saved” as an
ethical principle for disaster response rather than the more modest goal, “Save the Greatest Number”). As Professor Naomi Zack has explained, the more ambitious approach requires significant advance planning, whereas “Save the Greatest Number” fails to avoid
departures from ordinary morality and “is morally limited because the greatest number
who can be saved depends on the context in question.” Id.
227 If negligence is understood in economic terms to involve the reduction of accident
costs to an efficient level, however, the ethical requirements for disaster planning may go
further. See id. at 24 (contending, as a first position, “that we should not plan in advance
how to allocate scarce resources because we should not accept such scarcity while there is
time to augment resources or otherwise adequately prepare”).
228 Nussbaum, supra note 218, at 1009.
229 Id. (observing that “[w]hen the recognition is public, it constitutes an acknowledgment of moral culpability, something that frequently has significance in domestic and
international politics”); see also Williams, supra note 150, at 122 (“[T]he moral impulse that
had to be abandoned in the choice may find a new object, and I may try, for instance, to
‘make up’ to people involved for the claim that was neglected.”).
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any effective legal remedy. After major public disaster compensation often has been paid under special legislation enacted for the purpose and in several jurisdictions general
statutes provide for such compensation.230
Providing compensation would help to address the problem that those
whose property has the least economic value are most likely to be sacrificed. Indeed, despite notable failures, there is broad societal consensus
across the political spectrum that we have a moral obligation to mitigate disaster harm.231
Put in trolley car terms, if the state chooses to sacrifice one person
to save five, it ought to compensate the family of the one who was sacrificed. Because we are all vulnerable to harm, we all live on trolley
tracks, and any sacrifice should be shared. Although questions of social
justice do not necessarily turn on economic efficiency, the willingness
of those spared to compensate those harmed would also evidence the
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency of the tradeoff—that the choice generates a
value for society sufficient to compensate the losers while still leaving
the winners better off.232

230 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 196 cmt. h (1965). Some jurisdictions statutorily provide for compensation for property damage incurred as a matter of public necessity. See George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered from the Legal and Moral Points of
View, 48 Duke L.J. 975, 995–96 (1999); supra note 47 and accompanying text.
231 See Address to the Nation on Hurricane Katrina Recovery from New Orleans, Louisiana, 2 Pub. Papers 1439–44 (Sept. 15, 2005). In response to the devastation caused by
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, President George W. Bush remarked:
We have also witnessed the kind of desperation no citizen of this great and
generous nation should ever have to know: fellow Americans calling out for
food and water, vulnerable people left at the mercy of criminals who had no
mercy, and the bodies of the dead lying uncovered and untended in the
street.
Id.

232 See Posner, supra note 16, at 13; supra note 16 and accompanying text (providing
more information on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency); see also Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency
and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 241, 248–59 (2000)
(discussing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and concluding that it lacks moral importance). The
Kaldor-Hicks heuristic should not be pushed too far, however, as it might seem to elevate
economic considerations over other factors in assessing the costs of possible disaster tradeoffs. See Adler, supra, at 245–46. If economic factors, such as the market value of affected
property interests, are to be given a higher priority than considerations that are less easily
monetized, those priorities ought to be assigned through a transparent, political process
and not simply built into the model for assessing tradeoffs.
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IV. The Limits of Law?
If the defense of public necessity seems difficult to reconcile with
takings law, we might conclude that disasters fall outside the ordinary
framework of law and that state actors must simply do the best that they
can, exercising unlimited and essentially unchecked emergency powers.233 This Part contends, however, that natural disasters should not
suspend the rule of law.234 Without legal constraints on official action,
we cannot be assured that the actions of public officials will reflect our
shared values.235 Further, this Part contrasts the binary choice called for
in trolley problems with the complexities—institutional, procedural,
and temporal—of public disaster response, and argues that emergencies do not excuse a failure to engage in comprehensive advance planning.
Section A argues that the values at stake in disaster tradeoffs are
deeply contested, and that political process matters; communities that
may be impacted should have a voice in shaping the legal rules that will
apply when a disaster strikes.236 Section B then responds to the objection that extraordinary crises requiring the compromise of core values
fall outside the scope of law and should be resolved as necessity requires.237 The invocation of necessity as an extralegal concept ignores
233 See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1375, 1381 (2011) (observing that emergency response rules tend to afford state actors wide discretion, because
decisions cannot be made in the absence of information, and the information is not available until a crisis occurs); Jules Lobel, Comment, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 Yale L.J. 1385, 1407–10 (1989) (discussing Congress allowing for the exercise of
broad emergency powers during disasters, and noting that as a result of an “excessive and
uncontrolled” delegation of emergency authority to violate laws, such authority itself has
become routine and lawful).
234 See Super, supra note 233, at 1380 (noting that exercising discretion instead of following the law is often suboptimal—by the time information gathering is maximized so as
to best inform decision making, the number and quality of options may be diminished,
and the best options may no longer be available). One scholar has further noted that too
much flexibility in the exercise of discretion can lead to paralysis, and has argued that the
“hurried exercise of discretion” can be defective. See id. Instead, the “rule of law” includes
norms of like treatment and advance notice. See id. at 1377 (“Invocations of ‘the rule of
law’ may be demands for consistent treatment, but they are just as likely to be pleas to resolve issues under rules specified in advance.”).
235 See Zack, supra note 182, at 64 (“No matter how important the virtues of integrity
and diligence are for individual cultivation, contemporary disasters require a broader public responsibility on the part of what is generically understood to be ‘government’ and its
public policies.”).
236 See infra notes 239–259 and accompanying text; see also Shapiro, supra note 139, at
35–39 (endorsing local decisions and participation in collective self-governance by individuals with interests expected to be impacted by the collective action at issue).
237 See infra notes 260–270 and accompanying text.
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the critical role of disaster planning: to minimize harm, to mitigate
vulnerability, and, more broadly, to reflect society’s priorities. Finally,
Section C contends that an ad hoc approach to disaster tradeoffs would
also give short shrift to social justice concerns.238 Disaster harms often
follow from preexisting social inequality; leaving those harmed by government choices during disaster response to bear their own losses
would only exacerbate the problem.
A. Process Constraints
Although few would deny the general utility of legal guidelines for
disaster response, or the importance of clearly assigned institutional responsibilities, it does not necessarily follow that specific disaster tradeoffs should be subject to legal constraint. If the correct course of action
only becomes apparent in the midst of a crisis, legal rules could interfere either by dictating a different and suboptimal result or by imposing
bureaucratic delays.239 Yet, this assumes that we can, in theory, separate
substance and process. In fact, the defensibility of a substantive outcome
follows from the fairness or unfairness of the underlying procedure.
Consider the famous case of United States v. Holmes, decided by the
then-Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1842, in
which a lifeboat was adrift at sea and in danger of sinking.240 If all lives
were not to be lost, some of those onboard would have to be cast over
the side to drown. Sailors stood ready to obey the mate’s command as
ranking officer. But how was he to choose who should be killed? The
order was as follows:
The mate directed the crew “not to part man and wife, and not
to throw over any women.” There was no other principle of selection. There was no evidence of combination among the
crew. No lots were cast, nor had the passengers, at any time,
been either informed or consulted as to what was now done.241
The crew ejected fourteen male passengers from the lifeboat, and
the remaining passengers and crew were later rescued.242 The mate’s
238 See infra notes 271–286 and accompanying text.
239 See Super, supra note 233, at 1380 (contending that time spent gathering information before making a decision can exceed the benefit when it is more important to be
decisive than perfect).
240 26 F. Cas. 360, 361 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).
241 Id. at 361–62.
242 Id. In this regard, the court felt obliged to observe that “[n]ot one of the crew was
cast over. One of them, the cook, was a negro.” Id. At the time of the decision, it appears
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decision preserved many lives and seems to have had the merit of expedience, at the least. Without too much difficulty, however, we can imagine a number of alternatives that might also have produced the same
result (albeit with different distributive consequences): (1) majority
vote;243 (2) casting lots;244 (3) throwing people overboard according to
their weight, regardless of gender or status;245 (4) throwing people
overboard according to their age or health, regardless of gender or
status; (5) requiring the sailors to sacrifice themselves to protect the passengers entrusted to their care; (6) prioritizing the mate and as many
sailors as would be necessary to operate the lifeboat safely, and then putting the remaining sailors overboard, and, if necessary, choosing additional passengers according to one of the other methods listed above;
and (7) doing nothing so that all would drown together unless enough
people volunteered to drown to save the rest before it was too late.
In a subsequent criminal prosecution, the mate stood trial for
manslaughter.246 The court applied a fiduciary theory and instructed
the jury that if there were more sailors than needed to operate the
boat, “the supernumerary sailors have no right, for their safety, to sacrifice the passengers.”247 Assuming that the sailors and passengers all had
an equal right to live, however, the court further instructed that drawing lots would have been “the fairest mode, and, in some sort, as an appeal to God, for selection of the victim.”248 The lawyer for the accused

that a further principle of selection would have prioritized white over non-white persons,
regardless of status.
243 Various procedures for balloting and voting could, of course, impact the outcome.
See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, “Protecting the People from Themselves,” or How Direct Can Democracy Be?, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1717, 1729, 1773–74 (1998) (discussing various voting models);
Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U.
Chi. Legal F. 241, 242–43 (analyzing cumulative voting and comparing alternative voting
systems).
244 See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution 139 (1996) (arguing that drawing straws is the fairest way to determine who
will be sacrificed). Professor Ronald Dworkin disapproves of voting because many forces,
such as “kinship, friendships, enmities, [and] jealousies . . . that should not make a difference will then be decisive.” See id. This “lot casting” method, however, could also be combined with preconditions. For instance, the female passengers might have been excluded
so that lots would be drawn by only the male passengers and crew.
245 The idea would be to reduce the total number of lives lost, if the displaced weight
of the heaviest people on the boat could make it possible to survive with fewer sacrificed
lives.
246 Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 363.
247 Id. at 367.
248 Id.
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argued that the procedure of drawing lots was neither practically available nor likely to produce a better substantive outcome.249
The question of choice could have been deliberated not at the
time of emergency, but earlier in anticipation of like emergencies.250
The rule of law exists to guide behavior, even “at midnight, in a sinking
boat.”251 Because several methods of sorting the members of the lifeboat appear possible, and none are obviously correct, a legal rule for
tradeoffs of this kind would reduce confusion rather than engender
it.252
Even if we were to examine the lifeboat situation as an example of
a trolley problem, the applicability of a necessity defense for the mate’s
order remains unclear. Neither the redirected harm nor the hypothetical consent approaches canvassed in the previous Part produce clear
answers.253 First, whether the harm has been redirected or is newly
originated depends on how we frame the issue. Throwing someone out
of a boat is a violent act, like operating on a healthy patient to harvest
organs for the use of others.254 On the other hand, everyone on the
boat would otherwise have drowned, and the mate arguably redirected
the threatened harm toward a few individuals so that the majority
would survive. Unlike the surgeon hypothetical, those sacrificed would

249 See id. at 365 (reporting the defense counsel’s argument that it was unheard of to
cast lots “at midnight, in a sinking boat, in the midst of darkness, of rain, of terrour, and of
confusion”). The defense lawyer further argued that the sailors “adopted the only principle of selection which was possible in an emergency like theirs . . . a principle more humane than lots. Man and wife were not torn asunder, and the women were all preserved.
Lots would have rendered impossible this clear dictate of humanity.” Id.
250 See Wendy F. Hensel & Leslie E. Wolf, Playing God: The Legality of Plans Denying Scarce
Resources to People with Disabilities in Public Health Emergencies, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 719, 721 (2011)
(noting that decisions consciously made in anticipation of emergency are likely to be more
fair and reasoned than those made in the “midst of a full-blown disaster”); Jeremy Waldron, A Majority in the Lifeboat, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1043, 1051, 1055 (2010).
251 See Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 365.
252 See Robin Miskolcze, Women & Children First: Nineteenth-Century Sea
Narratives & American Identity 25–66 (2007) (discussing the development of evacuation priorities and the cultural values they embody). Giving advance scrutiny to the horrors of such tradeoffs might also lead to sensible seafaring rules requiring that vessels have
lifeboats adequate to handle all passengers and crew and that these lifeboats be regularly
maintained. See generally International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),
Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278 (prescribing some international seafaring
safety standards).
253 See supra notes 193–217 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 193–217 and accompanying text.
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not otherwise have lived, unless, of course, other individuals were sacrificed or volunteered to die instead.255
The question of hypothetical consent is also unclear because it depends on how we draw the “veil of ignorance.”256 A male passenger
traveling alone might not consent to be sacrificed so that others could
live, and might instead insist upon drawing lots.257 If we wanted to
avoid the influence of an individual’s particular circumstances, we
would need to ask a disembodied (neither male nor female)
chooser.258 This hypothetical decisionmaker would also be ignorant of
whether, if male, he would be a member of the crew, a single passenger,
or a passenger with a female companion also onboard. The hypothetical choice produced by this procedure, however, would have nothing to
do with the actual consent of those on the lifeboat.259
In sum, as the lifeboat case illustrates, the substantive and procedural aspects of justice are not easily disentangled. On the one hand,
inadequate decision processes can render tradeoffs unjust that might
otherwise have been defensible. On the other hand, a robust process
can bolster tradeoffs, even when difficult decisions are unavoidable.

255 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1091–92 (discussing the view that anybody “who can
be killed by pointing the [preexisting] threatening force wherever it is causally possible to
aim it—can be killed to maximize the number of people kept alive”). One scholar notes
that according to this view, it does not matter “whether those in range are killed by the preexisting threat or by some newly created force.” Id.
256 The term “veil of ignorance” is borrowed from John Rawls, who sought to formulate principles of justice through the use of a hypothetical decision procedure. See Rawls,
supra note 59, at 136–38.
257 See Thomson, supra note 211, at 180–81 (discussing the hypothetical beam fitter
who always works alone, and arguing that this beam fitter would decline to waive his right
not to be killed even if doing so would maximize the number of lives saved).
258 Others have suggested different approaches. Compare Thomson, supra note 211, at
180–81 (concluding that aiming the trolley at a lone worker such as a beam fitter is impermissible), with Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1127–29 (arguing that aiming the trolley at a
lone worker such as a beam fitter may be permissible depending, for example, on when or
how jobs are assigned, whether beam fitters are paid a risk premium, and the possibility of
transfer from a beam fitting position).
259 See Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2203, 2305
(1992) (discussing the problematic nature of hypothetical consent). Nevertheless, even if
the fiction of hypothetical consent makes it troublesome to apply, the focus on human
agreement rather than abstract moral injunction provides a different, more political perspective from which to approach moral dilemmas. In particular, the need to achieve consent represents the standpoint from which public deliberation of a legal rule might proceed. See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? 7 (2004)
(defining deliberative democracy as a “form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible”).
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B. The “Dirty Hands” Problem
Another possible objection to the formulation of legal rules for
disaster response is that, if the tradeoffs called for in disaster response
violate foundational moral or legal requirements, then it may be better
to deal with emergencies as circumstances demand according to a doctrine of necessity rather than by pretending that our legal system can
accommodate the compromise of its core values.260 Moreover, unlike a
trolley car driver’s decision, the choices made by public officials in the
context of disaster can create precedents for the suspension of liberties.261 Thus, it might be the case that stretching the law to cover disaster emergencies could debase the law without improving the quality of
those decisions.
In other words, hard questions should be resolved according to an
ad hoc principle of necessity rather than by reference to established
law.262 These arguments are sometimes bolstered with telling examples,
such as the ticking time bomb or the runaway trolley car. If there is no
time to reflect, and if the alternatives are all unpalatable, it is best just
to choose and have done with it. Pretending that the law can provide
an appropriate answer will only diminish respect for the rule of law.263

260 See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 Yale L.J. 1011, 1014–15, 1019 (2003) (describing a “downward cycle” when the
response to successive disasters leads to ever more repressive laws, and arguing that in
times of national crises, “democratic nations tend to race to the bottom as far as the protection of human rights and civil liberties . . . is concerned”).
261 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944) (upholding the compulsory exclusion of Japanese Americans during World War II due to circumstances of
“emergency and peril”); see also Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 361,
361–64 (1985) (discussing the slippery slope of a desirable restriction leading to another,
“increasingly invidious” one). As one commentator notes, “emergencies suspend, or at
least redefine, de facto, if not de jure, much of our cherished freedoms and rights.” See
Gross, supra note 260, at 1019.
262 See Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture and the State of Constitutional Culture, 61 SMU L. Rev. 221, 224 (2008) (noting that “[n]ecessity arguments claim that in
particular circumstances officials may undertake exceptional actions to achieve their legitimate goals, such as protecting national security, that would otherwise be prohibited if
the normal rule of law governed during normal conditions”).
263 See id. at 226 (arguing that when officials act “outside the constraints of fundamental law, the domain of law remains unsullied, but action taken according to necessity becomes lawless”). Professor Thomas Crocker has counseled caution, arguing that we should
“overcome the temptation to rely on necessity . . . when doing so threatens to alter our
broader commitments to living under constitutional constraints reflected in rightsprotecting and separation of power principles.” Id. at 227; see also Thomas P. Crocker, Presidential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1551, 1608–09, 1613 (2011)
(arguing that constitutional values limit the president’s power to do what is “necessary”).
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In the broadest sense, an objection to extending the rule of law to
exceptional, morally compromised choices seems misplaced because it
misunderstands the nature of public decision making. One scholar, for
instance, has pointed out that public life seems to require that even
“good men” commit moral wrongs for which they ought to feel guilty so
that they can accomplish greater utilitarian ends for society.264 It is not
possible to be effective in public life, in other words, unless one is willing to have dirty hands. We understand this about politicians; we want
them to be effective.265 The notion that the public must be protected
from knowledge that the world does not always align neatly and that
values can conflict seems both patronizing and self-defeating.266 Our
conception of the rule of law must not be so brittle that it cannot withstand contact with reality.
Nor does the objection to legal rules for moral dilemmas seem applicable in the context of disaster response. With respect to disaster
tradeoffs, the question is not so much whether or not we will have dirty
hands—it may be that all available options involve the loss of life—but
how those choices will be made and whether we are willing, collectively,
to own up to the consequences. A moral response to disaster cannot
ignore law, because law represents collective judgment, and only
through full community participation can we derive appropriate rules
for triage.
In this vein, one scholar has argued that our interests in disaster
planning must stem from what we individually feel is just, meaning,
what we would want as justice for ourselves because we are all vulnerable to disaster harm.267 As the scholar explains, “If there is a prior consensus that our moral rules are not absolute but subject to exceptions
in unusual situations, then we need to clarify what the exceptions are
before they occur.”268 Such clarification should be resolved through the
political process rather than apart from it:

264 See Walzer, supra note 218, at 165.
265 See id.
266 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Isaiah Berlin, Liberty 166, 212 (Henry
Hardy ed., 2002) (criticizing the “ancient faith [which] rests on the conviction that all the
positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps
even entail one another”).
267 See Zack supra note 182, at 25–26. This argument can be seen as an application of
the hypothetical approach to trolley problems. See id.; see also Martha Albertson Fineman,
The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 Emory L.J. 251, 266–69 (2010) (describing
the human condition as one of vulnerability).
268 Zack, supra note 182, at 40.
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There is nothing wrong with providing exceptions or specifications to our moral principles before the fact of a disaster
and then applying those specifications when the time comes.
But there is clearly something suspect in making up the exceptions and specifications in the moment of a disaster because that opens the door to mere rationalization and justification after the fact.269
Thus, rather than complacent acceptance of the dirty hands of those
who make tradeoffs on our behalf, deliberation and rulemaking would
improve the quality of disaster decision making and avoid situations in
which a person’s life is sacrificed according to a principle that he did
not select, was not aware of, and had no opportunity to influence.270
The stylized emergency situations represented by trolley problems
can obscure the extent to which disaster tradeoffs ought to be anticipated and made subject to comprehensive planning that seeks to
minimize the need for sacrifice and to arrive at rules for necessary
tradeoffs through an open, deliberative process. In a democratic society, law can allocate benefits and burdens so that tradeoffs reflect our
commitment to self-government and shared sacrifice rather than an
expedient victimization of the already vulnerable.
C. Social Justice After Disaster
A natural disaster is, in the first instance, a misnomer. Whether
natural phenomena become disasters is “contingent upon human exposure and a lack of capacity to cope.”271 Although we are all vulner269 Id. at 41.
270 If it were published as law of the sea that single male passengers can expect to be
first to go over the side in an overcrowded lifeboat (or to be left on ship), those passengers
might choose not to travel, insist on paying a reduced fare, or insist on documentation of
safety compliance. I do not mean to suggest that most individuals are fully rational actors
and would adjust their behavior to an efficient level given their risk tolerance, but I do
contend that anyone who may be exposed to harm deserves the fullest possible disclosure.
See supra notes 181–217 and accompanying text (discussing annual notices given to individuals living in areas subject to flooding describing the consequences if nearby levees are
opened).
271 Mark Pelling, Paradigms of Risk, in Natural Disasters and Development in a
Globalizing World 3, 4 (Mark Pelling ed., 2003) (noting that natural disaster is a “humanitarian disaster with a natural trigger”); see also Ben Aguirre et al., Institutional Resilience
and Disaster Planning for New Hazards: Insights from Hospitals, 2 J. Homeland Security &
Emergency Mgmt. 1, 1 (2005) (quoting the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
definition of “disaster” as an “ecological disruption causing human, material, or environmental losses that exceed the ability of the affected community to cope using its own resources, often calling for outside assistance”).
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able to disaster,272 those without access to resources generally suffer the
greatest harm.273 According to social geographers who have studied the
vulnerability of social systems to natural hazards, the “dominant component” in measuring social vulnerability is socioeconomic status.274
Other components that increase social vulnerability include race and
ethnicity.275 Put another way, “[d]isasters are income neutral and colorblind. Their impacts, however, are not.”276
Along similar lines, two sociologists who have written about the
inadequacy of the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina define
a social disaster as “predicated upon and exacerbated by structural inequality and human decisionmaking.”277 These sociologists conclude
that “[s]ocial disasters reproduce and reinforce social injustices.”278
Thus, social inequality correlates with vulnerability to disaster.

272 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 8 (2008) (contending that human vulnerability is not a
pathological condition, but rather “a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human
condition that must be at the heart of our concept of social and state responsibility”).
273 See Austin Sarat & Javier Lezaun, Introduction: The Challenge of Crisis and Catastrophe
in Law and Politics, in Catastrophe: Law, Politics, and the Humanitarian Impulse 1, 3
(Austin Sarat & Javier Lezaun eds., 2009) (“[D]isasters might end up exacerbating inequalities and discriminations, but, at the very least, they can serve to make the plight of
vulnerable and underprivileged groups strikingly visible, by manifesting inequality in the
rawest, most unadulterated way.”). Put differently, natural events have the potential to
become disasters to the extent that human beings are vulnerable to them. See Matthew D.
Adler, Policy Analysis for Natural Hazards: Some Cautionary Lessons from Environmental Policy
Analysis, 56 Duke L.J. 1, 42 (2006) (“The term often used in the [social science] literature
is population ‘vulnerability’: earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, droughts, tornadoes, and
avalanches harm humans because of an interaction between a natural event and a human
population that is ‘vulnerable,’ to some extent, to that event.”).
274 See Susan L. Cutter & Christina Finch, Temporal and Spatial Changes in Social Vulnerability to Natural Hazards, 105 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. 2301, 2301 (2008) (reporting on an
empirical study of the historical variability in social vulnerability in the United States from
1960 to 2000). Social vulnerability has been defined as “the sensitivity of a population to
natural hazards and its ability to respond to and recover from the impacts of hazards.” Id.
275 See id.
276 Susan L. Cutter, The Geography of Social Vulnerability: Race, Class, and Catastrophe, in
Farber & Chen, supra note 22, at 120, 123–24.
277 Kristin A. Bates & Richelle S. Swan, Through the Eye of Katrina: Social
Justice in the United States 6 (2d ed. 2010) (“[A] social disaster can be triggered by a
force of nature, such as a hurricane, but ultimately it is rooted in the choices that society’s
members make and the prioritization of some lives over others.”).
278 Id. at 7. To some extent, natural disasters strike regardless of the victims’ race, gender, or social status, but “[i]f one were to draw a map of places in which disasters are most
likely to strike, we would also be sketching at least an approximate map of places in which
the vulnerable are most likely to be gathered.” See Sarat & Lezaun, supra note 273, at 3
(internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the politics of disaster inequality).
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Removing disaster tradeoffs from the ambit of ordinary rule-of-law
constraints would exacerbate preexisting inequalities. Rather than reinforce the public necessity defense, we should reject it. The defense is
pernicious, in part because it rests upon the faulty assumption that
those who lose their home and possessions are equal in social status to
those whose property is thereby protected, to say nothing of the judges
and legislators who decide what compensation, if any, is owed. The assumption that pre-disaster conditions are neutral lacks empirical support on two levels. First, there is no evidence to support a claim that
those whose interests are sacrificed—the rural poor, for instance—
stand on equal social, economic, or political footing with larger communities whose interests often take precedence. Second, the majority
of those exposed to harm are often the most vulnerable in society and
lack the social and economic means to self-insure against possible
loss.279
In the wake of Hurricane Sandy in October 2012, for instance, new
attention has been paid to the notion of erecting sea barriers to protect
Manhattan.280 Yet, water diverted by a barrier will, inevitably, go someplace else.281 In this regard, it is notable and troubling that “Wall Street
is worth vastly more, in dollar terms, than certain low-lying neighborhoods of Brooklyn, Staten Island and Queens—and that to save Manhattan, planners may decide to flood some other part of the city.”282
Tradeoffs, it seems, may be made in the midst of disaster or embodied
in plans that would shield high-priced neighborhoods from flooding
while raising floodwater by as much as two feet elsewhere.283 The answer is not to shy away from disaster preparation, but is rather to ensure
that the decision-making process is inclusive and that the state accepts
responsibility for those tradeoffs that cannot be averted.
Thus, to talk about disaster is also to talk about social structures.
Disaster law and policy necessarily encompasses questions of social jus279 See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 71, at 1473 (“Too often, those who suffer most are
the poorest members of society—those who lack either the ability to evacuate from a
floodplain or the financial means to settle in less vulnerable areas.”). Some observers contend that federal flood control efforts and compensation schemes actually create perverse
incentives that increase the number of floodplain residents. See id.
280 See McKenzie Funk, Deciding Where Future Disasters Will Strike, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4,
2012, at SR9. Hurricane Sandy caused significant damage to New Jersey, New York, and
other parts of the eastern United States. See Andy Newman, Hurricane Sandy vs. Hurricane
Katrina, N.Y. Times City Room Blog (Nov. 27, 2012 4:17 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.
nytimes.com/2012/11/27/hurricane-sandy-vs-hurricane-katrina/.
281 See Funk, supra note 280.
282 Id.
283 See id.
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tice, because effective disaster planning seeks to mitigate vulnerability.
Identifying structural factors that put individuals at greater risk or influence their ability to respond to disaster can help guide decisions
about risk allocation in disaster planning and response.284 Questions of
social justice cannot be set to the side in the wake of a disaster, because
awareness of social inequality is integral to understanding the harm
that has been caused.285 Disasters’ harms fall unevenly according to
wealth, race, gender, social status, and other factors.286
Conclusion
Affected landowners deserve recompense when the state destroys
their property in the context of a broader disaster response. Yet, the
federal government, along with some state governments, continues to
invoke the doctrine of public necessity to absolve itself from any responsibility for costs imposed on private parties through deliberate
flooding, controlled burns, and other measures taken in the midst of a
crisis to protect the public.287 The government’s real involvement, however, begins before the onset of any particular disaster and includes
choices concerning the zoning of residences and businesses, the construction of levees, reservoirs, and dams, and other activities that affect
a community’s vulnerability to disaster.

284 See Susan L. Cutter, The Vulnerability of Science and the Science of Vulnerability, 93 Annals Ass’n Am. Geographers 1, 6 (2003) (discussing the value of vulnerability science in
developing risk, hazard, and disaster reduction policies).
285 See Cutter, supra note 276, at 120 (contending that disaster response failures follow
from “failures of the social support system for America’s impoverished—the largely invisible inner city poor”).
286 See Adler, supra note 273, at 42 (“Social science data is, of course, crucial to natural
hazards risk assessment. The term often used in the literature is population ‘vulnerability’
. . . .”).
287 See generally TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 98 (2012) (finding the
government not liable for damaging property in efforts to prevent wildfires from spreading and discussing the necessity defense); Bass v. Louisiana, 34 La. Ann. 494 (1882) (declining to provide compensation for government-inflicted damage to land resulting from
construction of a levee); Atken v. Vill. of Wells River, 70 Vt. 308 (1898) (same); Short v.
Pierce Cnty., 78 P.2d 610 (Wash. 1938) (providing no compensation for government inflicted damage to property in the course of controlling floodwaters). These cases adhere to
the general view that there is no duty to compensate the owner of property damaged or
destroyed in situations of public necessity. See Cohan, supra note 2, at 691–94 (discussing
the public necessity doctrine and the issue of compensation). “Where the danger affects
the entire community, or so many people that the public interest is involved, that interest
serves as a complete justification to the defendant who acts to avert the peril to all.”
Keeton et al., supra note 30, § 24.
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Moreover, although public officials need wide latitude to manage a
disaster response, authority to act is not itself a justification for withholding payment for damages caused along the way. Indeed, the moral
obligation to compensate for harm done was evident even in 1927
when New Orleans sought to deluge its neighbors to escape danger and
agreed that it would make whole their losses—a promise conveniently
forgotten. Adhering to the principle of just compensation—whether
instituted via statute or judicial reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause—would preserve the government’s emergency
powers in full while reaffirming the rule of law and advancing the interests of social justice.
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